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Abstract 
This thesis examines and compares two cases of national visa practices within the Schengen 
area – the Finnish and the Norwegian case. The study particularly aims to compare how 
Finland and Norway negotiate new Schengen rules and regulations to shape their everyday 
visa politics, as well as their respective visa regimes with Russia. In what ways are the two 
cases different, which country has the most efficient practices, how can the differences 
between Finland and Norway be explained and what implications do they have? Taking these 
questions into account, the study provides a discussion on the numerous dimensions of 
national visa politics, arguing that Finland practices its visa policies more efficiently than 
Norway and that this can be best explained by its history of bordering traditions. 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
It can be said that the Schengen Agreement has opened the door to a “borderless Europe”. 
Internal border checks have been transferred to the external frontiers of the Schengen Area, 
allowing its citizens to travel between 26 countries without requiring a passport. The 
agreement has changed, and harmonized the rules in which European states used to manage 
their borders and practice their visa policies. In theory, all Schengen countries are bound by 
the same rules, embedded in the legal framework of the agreement. In reality, however, the 
countries appear quite different from one another in the ways they negotiate and implement 
the Schengen acquis, practice their daily visa politics, and manage the common external 
borders of the Schengen Area. This thesis compares two neighbouring Schengen members, 
Finland and Norway, and attempts to explain how and why their visa practices towards Russia 
differ. Based on the two cases, the thesis will further try to discuss the wider impact of these 
differences, taking into account other signatories who share a border with Russia, as well as 
Schengen as a whole. The thesis argues that Finland practices its visa policy more efficiently 
than Norway and that this can be explained by its history of bordering traditions. 
 
1.1 Common external border and “the Schengen exceptions” 
 
The neighbours Finland and Norway both mark Schengen’s external frontiers to Russia. 
However, the bilateral visa regimes each of them has with Russia at the national level have 
been formed differently. Firstly, this is linked to the efficiency of visa issuance procedures 
and the subsequent cross-border movement. For instance, in 2012 Finland issued twice as 
many visas to Russians as Norway.1 Secondly, the difference is related to the way the two 
countries negotiate, interpret and implement the Schengen acquis (rules and regulations). The 
2010 Norwegian-Russian bilateral agreement on a visa-free travel zone is clear evidence of 
the so-called “Schengen exceptions”, where Norway managed to negotiate an exceptional visa 
arrangement in line with its own national interests, despite Schengen’s rather uniform legal 
framework. In contrast to Norway, Finland does not have such an arrangement with Russia. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Barents Observer (2013b). ”Finland with twice as many visas than Norway”. Published on January 6, 2012. 
URL: http://barentsobserver.com/en/borders/finland-twice-many-visas-norway (Retrieved on April 3,  2013). 
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At the supranational level, the European Union (EU) and Russia have been in extensive 
negotiation on two major visa developments in the past few years: the revision of the 2008 
visa facilitation agreement2, and the “common steps towards visa-free travel regime”, which 
can be traced back to the EU-Russia Summit in 20033. This brings up the importance of the 
EU-Russian relationship in Schengen’s Common Visa Policy (CVP). According to the 
European Commission, Russia is seen as “the third trading partner of the EU.” 4 Moreover, 
Russia has recently become a WTO member, which makes it economically more integrated 
into the EU’s trading area. The supranational relationship suggestively anchors and dominates 
bilateral visa politics, which member states may conduct with Russia at the national level. 
This implies that if the EU and Russia were to sign an agreement on full or partial visa 
liberalization, national interests of peripheral states like Finland or Norway would most likely 
be overrun. For Norway, who is a non-EU Schengen member and lacks voting rights at the 
supranational level, the chances of influencing the EU-Russian relationship are, perhaps, even 
smaller than Finland’s. Although lately, these supranational visa negotiations have been 
hampered. On the one hand, they are hampered by the EU’s unwillingness to accept Russia’s 
demands on full visa liberalization for holders of “service passports”. On the other hand, the 
negotiations have been slowed down by Russia’s reluctance to the loosening of border checks 
for all Europeans.5 Given these circumstances, supranational visa agreements may not always 
be the preferable strategy for Europe or Russia, which increases the chances for negotiating 
bilateral visa agreements with individual Schengen states, such as Finland or Norway.    
 
The Schengen Agreement is an important part of both Finland and Norway’s political 
agendas. On the positive side, it greatly contributes to their economic and commercial 
relations across Europe, by facilitating the movement of persons. Moreover, both countries 
have experienced a boost to their local economies as a consequence of the growing flow of 
Russian tourists.6 However, Schengen has its shortcomings: the growing criminal activity 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 EU Observer (2013). ”EU and Russia in visa talks, despite Magnitsky regret.” Published on March 21, 2013. 
URL: http://euobserver.com/foreign/119519 (Retrieved on April 15). 
3 European Commission (2013b).”Common steps towards visa-free short-term travel of Russian and EU 
citizens.” Published on March 11, 2013. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-
new/news/news/2013/20130311_02_en.htm (Retrieved on April 20, 2013).  
4 European Commission (2013). Trade: Russia. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-opportunities/bilateral-
relations/countries/russia/. (Retrieved on April 12, 2013). 
5 Staalesen, Atle (2013). Interview by Elizaveta Vassilieva, April 5, 2013.	  
6 Finnmarken (2013). ”Frykter utmelding av Schengen”. Published on April 8, 2013. URL: 
http://www.finnmarken.no/lokale_nyheter/article6592523.ece (Retrieved on April 15, 2013). 
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frequently forces member states like Finland and Norway to be cautious of the developments 
within Schengen, or to question their participation in it. For instance, in 2011 Finland opposed 
Schengen enlargement by objecting the admission of Romania and Bulgaria into the 
cooperation.7 In the Norwegian election campaign during the spring of 2013, the Schengen 
membership was put to debate when the Centre Party declared that it wanted to get Norway 
out of the Schengen cooperation, because of the increased crime level that comes with the 
freedom of movement.8  
 
The examples above demonstrate that at least two factors, economy and security, are crucial 
when Finland and Norway conduct their visa policies towards Russia, because the common 
external border not only gives Schengen member states equal opportunities, but also poses 
equal threats. Interestingly, by going deeper into the analysis of national visa practices, one 
discovers that economy and security alone cannot fully explain why Norway and Russia 
signed a bilateral agreement on a visa-free border zone, while Finland and Russia have not. In 
other words, border politics and the “Schengen exceptions” are better understood as multi-
layered concepts, which is a crucial aspect behind this study.   
 
As the debate on the freedom of movement versus state security continues in Europe, the 
vitality of Schengen is often questioned. This raises a need to evaluate the current system and 
discuss how signatories can best utilize it. The focus of this study will thus be the Schengen 
CVP, and its application into bilateral visa regimes of peripheral signatories (Finland and 
Norway) vis-à-vis Russia.  
 
The goal of this thesis is not to establish whether the case countries manage to cope with 
security issues, such as the growing level of illegal migration or liberalized crime. In order to 
do so, a more thorough analysis would have to be conducted on Schengen’s security 
apparatus, including the Schengen Information and the Visa Information systems. Neither is 
the goal to analyze how the Schengen Agreement should develop in the future, since this 
would be beyond the scope of this study. The primary goal of this thesis, however, is to 
analyze and compare how Schengen members negotiate rules and regulations from the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The New York Times (2013). ”Europe denies 2 nations entry to travel zone.” Published on September 22, 
2011. URL: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/23/world/europe/romania-and-bulgaria-are-denied-entry-to-
schengen-zone.html?_r=1& (Retrieved on March 21, 2013).  
8 Aftenposten (2013). ”Navarsete: Schengen vil aldri sette regjeringssamarbeidet på spill”. Published on April 
10, 2013. URL: http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/Navarsete---Schengen-vil-aldri-sette-regjeringssamarbeidet-
pa-spill-7170022.html#.UW1dS7-AGvs (Retrieved on April 15, 2013).	  
	  14	  
Schengen institutional framework, establishing the degree of flexibility in their national 
practices of the Schengen CVP. In doing so, specific attention will be given to history and the 
concept of “bordering”. The secondary aim of this study is to discuss the wider implications 
of the different national experiences, related to bilateral agreements with Russia, for Finland 
and Norway.  
The analysis in this thesis will subsequently be built around the following research question: 
how does Finland negotiate with Schengen on legislation to shape its visa regime vis-à-vis 
Russia, compared to how Norway does?  
 
The following section will present a number of studies previously conducted on the CVP and 
the influence of borders within the Schengen Area. 
 
1.2 Previous research on Schengen’s borders and visa politics 
 
In the wider scope of previous research on the Schengen Agreement and visa politics, one 
finds a number of studies related to the EU’s CVP. There are at least four main categories into 
which these studies can be sorted. Firstly, there is a category of studies that examine border 
regions as a subject of the supranational political relationship between the EU and Russia, 
which forms an important basis for the discussion on the future of the Schengen acquis as 
well as the bilateral Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFAs). Sergei Pronozov, for instance, 
discusses the geopolitical challenges and conflicts, affecting border politics between Finland 
and Russia. 9  He argues that the EU-Russian relations are not only developing as a 
conventionally international phenomenon, but also as an increasingly regional and 
transboundary one. According to Pronozov, the formation of buffer-border regions such as the 
Republic of Karelia has enhanced cross-border cooperation, making cooperation not only an 
end but also a means to more efficient solving of territorial problems. In this context, he 
draws attention to “border deproblematization” – linked to the role of the EU – and the logic 
of the problem-solving cross-border cooperation between the EU and Russia. Further, he 
discusses the posing problem of “the Schengen Curtain”: because of its eastern extensions, the 
EU has imposed stricter visa regimes for Russia, leading to a relative exclusion of Russia 
from the EU on one hand, and Russia’s “passive influence” on the other.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Pronozov, Sergei (2004). ”Border Regions and the politics of EU – Russian relations. The role of the EU in 
tempering and producing border conflicts.” (pp. 1-3). Working Paper Series in EU Border Conflicts, Danish 
Institute for International Studies, Department of European Studies. No. 3, January 2004.  
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In line with Pronozov, Elena Jileva touches upon the Schengen Agreement’s extension 
eastwards, which constitutes the second category of studies. Building on the issue of the EU 
Migration Regime, she discusses the development of the EU’s CVP.10 According to Jileva, 
the process of enlargement towards the East can be described as a technical and rather 
depoliticized process, in which the Schengen acquis have been transferred to the Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEEC). Similar to Pronozov, she argues that the adaptation of 
the EU’s visa acquis by the CEEC has led to exclusionary visa politics with their Eastern 
neighbors, hindering the movement of people across borders.    
Heather Grabbe also highlights the problem of “the Schengen Curtain.”11 Studying the 
potential consequences of an expanding free-travel area for European security, she argues that 
Schengen has given rise to tensions between the different levels of security policies in the EU. 
For instance, the acceptance of the Schengen acquis by CEEC leads to disruption and 
considerably complicates bilateral relations with their Eastern neighbors outside Schengen. 
Moreover, the Schengen signatories have been given different opportunities in influencing the 
border and visa policies they implemented. Although Grabbe’s research was conducted before 
most of the Eastern Enlargements actually took place, it adds an important critical perspective 
to the scope of previous research on Schengen and the CVP. 
The third category of studies focuses on the characteristics of Schengen’s external borders. 
James Wesley Scott is one of the few who has brought the concept of “bordering” into the 
discussion on EU’s external borders. 12  In his study he looks at regional cross-border 
cooperation and development, arguing that bordering, or the practice of every day border 
politics is a multidimensional phenomenon. Scott’s study suggests that factors like culture, 
history and the everyday communication between people affect the way border and visa 
politics between states are ultimately formed. This category is particularly relevant to my 
study, as it will be used to create a conceptual approach for the second part of my analysis in 
chapter four.     
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Jileva, Elena (2003). Larger than the European Union: The Emerging EU Migration Regime and Enlargement. 
Chapter 4 in Lavenex, S. and Uçarer Emek M., Migration and the Externalities of European Integration. 
Lexington Books, 2003: Oxford. 
11 Grabbe, Heather (2000). “The sharp edges of Europe: security implications of extending EU border policies 
eastward”. The Institute for Security Studies, Western European Union. Paris: March 2000. 
12 Scott, James Wesley (2011). “State of the Debate Report D6 (WP1)”. EUROBORDERREGIONS, EU External 
Borders and the Immediate Neighbours. Analysing Regional Development Options through Policies and 
Practices of Cross-Border Cop- operation. Prepared on August 28, 2011. 	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Another category of particular relevance for my study is the fourth category, which takes a 
closer approach to the national practices of the EU’s CVP, including the Finnish and 
Norwegian practices. Pekka Järviö et al. adopt a comparative approach to Schengen border 
regions and visa politics. In “Ex Borea Lux?” they present a number of cases comparing the 
“Finnish and Norwegian cross-border cooperation experience on their Eastern borders.”13 
The work also touches upon the practices in visa politics and border management, arguing 
that the Finnish experiences in this field have proven more efficient than the Norwegian. 
Järviö further discusses the implications of the Finnish and Norwegian cooperation 
experience for countries on the EU’s other eastern borders (both EU- and non-EU members) – 
Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine and Moldova. The main argument here is that 
state borders are an obstacle to development in border regions, because they hinder day-to-
day contact across the EU’s external frontiers. The process of European integration may have 
softened the internal borders of the Schengen Area, but it introduced a common visa regime 
on its external borders, making them less permeable and “cooperation-hindering”. However, 
the Finnish experience demonstrates that Schengen visa policy is, after all, flexible, allowing 
signatories to utilize its possibilities within the applicable rules without hindering cooperation 
across the EU’s external border.   
  
Fredrik Finstad discusses Schengen as a central part of Norway’s relationship with the EU in 
the field of justice and home affairs.14 He examines Norway’s background for, and degree of, 
participation in the Schengen cooperation, as well as the opportunities Norway has in 
influencing its legislation. Finstad argues that the Norwegian motives for participation were 
mainly (1) to retain its Nordic freedom of travel and (2) to join the international police 
cooperation.15 Norway takes an active role in the developments of the Schengen legislation on 
the Council level. According to Article 4 of the Schengen Agreement, Norway has the right to 
attend, participate, and make proposals for legislation in Schengen negotiations. This implies 
that Norway has a better chance in influencing the Schengen acquis to shape its visa regime 
than, for instance, influencing EU legislation through the Agreement on the European 
Economic Area (EEA).  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Järviö, Pekka et al. (2012). Ex Borea Lux? Learning from the Finnish and Norwegian Cross-border 
Cooperation Experience on their Eastern Borders. Published on November 2012. Prague, Czech Republic: 
Institute for Stability and Development. 
14 Finstad, Fredrik Bøckman (2008). ”Norges tilknytning til EUs justis- og innenrikspolitikk”, Nytt Norsk 
Tidsskrift 4/2008. (pp. 336-347). 
15 The Nordic Passport Union of 1954.	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The 2012 Report from the Committee appointed by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (The Europe Review) compares Norway’s participation in the Schengen and EEA 
agreements as well.16 Despite the fact that the institutional framework for the Schengen-
cooperation is more inclusive in terms of its decision-making process, compared to the EEA, 
Norway’s chances in influencing its legislation are moderate. The challenge for Norway is 
that most association agreements, which link Norway to the EU, do not have a separate 
content. Instead, they are commitment agreements, obliging Norway to implement the already 
existing EU legislation, dynamically adapting to it in line with the EU’s developments. 
Formally, if Norway refuses to implement Schengen legislation, the entire association 
agreement would fall apart. Nevertheless, The Europe Report argues that the practical aspects 
of Norway’s participation in Schengen have been developing much more successfully. Since 
1999, Norway has managed to broadly utilize Schengen legislation, by interpreting the 
Schengen acquis in a very liberal way and applying them to new policy areas. 
 
As for the Finnish case, Salminen and Moshes have examined Finland’s role in the Schengen 
visa politics. Their study compares Finland and four other EU member states in their visa 
regimes vis-à-vis Russia: the practices of their visa regimes, the conditions under which these 
regimes function, and the various concerns regarding visa freedom.17 According to the study, 
the differences in visa practices can be explained by factors like culture, history and national 
legislation. As Salminen and Moshes interestingly argue, “the current practices indicate that 
the [Schengen visa] system has shortcomings and will continue to deteriorate in the future.”18 
Even though visas are useful in controlling cross-border movement, they give no guarantee of 
crime prevention or security to Schengen member states.  
 
 
1.3 Justification for the study  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 The Europe Review (2010). ”Outside and Inside. Norway’s Agreements with the EU”.  (NOU 2012: 2) Report 
from committee appointed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 7 January 2010. Submitted to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs 17 January 2012. Published by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012: Oslo.  
17 Salminen, Minna-Mari and Arkady Moshes (2009).  ”Practice what you preach. The prospects for visa 
freedom in Russia-EU relations”. FIIA Report 2009 18, Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.  
18 Salminen, et al. (2009), (p. 49).	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The Schengen Agreement is arguably becoming increasingly important discussion topic both 
within the EU, supranationally, and in individual members of the Schengen area, but also for 
external actors, such as Russia, who are affected by its developments. Keeping in mind the 
benefits of free movement on the one hand, and the problems related to liberalization of cross-
border crime on the other, it becomes even more crucial to learn from the different 
experiences of border management and visa issuance. However, the literature presented above 
suggests that the contemporary discussion on the Schengen Agreement rarely examines visa 
policy as a separate topic. Moreover, the cases of Finland and Norway’s visa practices are 
rarely compared in detail. Therefore, the goal of this thesis is to contribute to the 
contemporary discussion by studying the “formula for success” in national visa practices, 
including these particular case countries.  
 
It is reasonable to assume that the practice of negotiation constitutes an important part of the 
EU’s CVP. However, this area often left out of the contemporary discussion on visa practices. 
For this reason, a central aspect that separates this study from the previous research is that it 
also includes negotiation and implementation practices, as opposed to merely the executive 
visa practices, into the comparative study of Finland and Norway.  
 
Another central objective of my study is to draw the concept of bordering into the analysis on 
national visa practices, which is highly important due to its attention to the underlying 
complexity behind each case. The purpose of this is to add new perspectives into the 
subsequent discussion, and establish the best explanation for the differences in visa practices. 
 
Overall, the strength of my research can be justified by the unique combination of its three 
main objectives: the narrowness of the topic, the selection of cases and the composition of the 
conceptual approach. The following section will explain more thoroughly how this 
combination of goals will be reached. 
 
1.4 Research method and sources 
To study the aspect of visa politics, a comparative empirical approach will be taken. Each 
case country’s visa practices will be carefully examined and compared with the other country 
on three levels: the executive visa practices-, implementation- and negotiation level. The 
purpose of using three levels is to illustrate the run of the Schengen acquis from their 
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formation to their application into national policies. This suggests that the ways in which 
Finland and Norway negotiate with Schengen are linked to their national CVP practices, or, 
rather, that national practices establish the political interests and behaviour behind negotiation 
procedures. An advantage of this empirical, three-level approach is that it allows one to study 
each case individually, taking in account all the specific events and facts attached to it. 
 
A weakness of the empirical approach is that it lacks a theoretical basis, which makes it more 
difficult to draw general conclusions and link them to a broader discipline of existing 
approaches.19 To compensate for this, the analysis is going to include a set of explanatory 
factors, based on the so-called “bordering dimensions”. The concept of “bordering” claims 
that borders are complex and multidimensional, which implies that the politics of border 
management are too (this will be further explained in chapter two). The purpose of using this 
concept in the analysis is to establish which bordering dimensions (factors) affect the ways in 
which Finland and Norway implement and practice Schengen. In order to do so, the following 
set of factors will be used: culture, economy, security and historical bordering traditions. A 
clear advantage of the factor analysis is that it draws attention to the complexity of politics, 
including, for instance, the psychological aspect that lies in culture. Another advantage of this 
approach is that it allows for a more detailed, and more precise, research. However, factor 
analysis is time consuming and gives no guarantee of a valid result. For instance, the chosen 
factors may not have a good explanatory power, or other significant factors may be left out of 
the analysis. Taking this into consideration, the study could have included more than four 
factors, although this would have been beyond the scope and time limit of this thesis.  
 
To answer the research question, I will ask a number of empirical sub-questions regarding 
Finland and Norway’s visa practices in relation to their respective bordering traditions, 
national visa regimes with Russia, and implementation of the Schengen acquis: 
 
• What is bordering, and what role does it play in Schengen’s national visa regimes 
towards Russia?  
• In which ways are the national experiences in Finland and Norway different, in terms 
of: 
a) Their executive visa practices  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Hsieh, Chih-en (year of publishment is unknown). ”Strengths and Weaknesses of Qualitative Case Study 
Research.” University of Leicester Publishing. 
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b) Their implementation and negotiation of the Schengen acquis  
• Why are the national visa experiences in Finland and Norway different, and which 
factors can best explain these differences? 
 
Furthermore, a reflective question will be asked about the consequences of the different 
experiences. The purpose of this is to discuss the role of intergovernmentalism in the 
Schengen cooperation and how the relatively strong national characteristics can be an 
advantage to its future developments. 
 
The empirical basis for the analysis will be institutional agreements within Schengen and 
externally with Russia, which will be examined in light of their interpretation by the case 
countries, and their practical application into various policy areas. It is reasonable to assume 
that institutional agreements represent a backbone and a justification for the policies that stem 
from it. An advantage to this is that national visa policies can be traced from their current 
practices to their common origins, which makes it easier to compare how differently they 
shaped. Also, institutional agreements represent the outcome of intergovernmental 
negotiations, which can be useful in the discussion on negotiation practices – if the outcome 
correlates with the initial interests of the case countries, their negotiation practices can be 
deemed efficient. There are, however, a few significant weaknesses in using this type of 
source. Firstly, institutional agreements alone say very little about how states interpret the 
content incorporated in them. Secondly, they give no reference to the course of negotiations 
that formed them or the national interests at stake.  
To solve this problem, a selection of other primary sources will be used in the analysis as 
well: governments’ official documents, reviews, reports, news articles and statistical data 
from national consulates and customs. This variation of sources makes it easier to examine 
my research topic more in depth and, at the same time, bring in different perspectives (the 
difference being, for instance, between the governments or media actors). However, a 
weakness to these sources is that they can be confusing or misleading – reviews and 
documents can be misleading in their focus, news articles can avoid relevant details, and 
statistical findings can be inaccessible or outdated. 
Hopefully, such uncertainty can be avoided by conducting a number of personal interviews 
with diplomats and experts who, to some degree, were involved in the Schengen negotiations. 
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This way, questions can be aimed directly at the research problem and the collected 
information will be comprehensive. Nevertheless, the current respondents may not always be 
able to answer all questions properly, either because they do not have the information or 
because the questions are weakly formulated. Thus, a number of secondary studies will be 
used to the extent that they can complement the personal interviews.  
 
1.5 Structure and argument 
The following chapter (chapter two) introduces the concept of bordering, the Schengen 
Agreement (including its legal framework), and the historical overview of bordering traditions 
in Europe, Finland and Norway. The chapter will use the following questions as a starting 
point. 
 
• What is bordering, and what role does it play in the current Schengen visa regime 
towards Russia?  
• What are the bordering traditions and historical events that shaped the Schengen 
Agreement and how did Finland and Norway become associated with this 
cooperation?  
 
The following two chapters, three and four, provide the main analysis of this study. Chapter 
three examines national experiences in Finland and Norway, comparing visa practices, 
implementation of the Schengen acquis and negotiation procedures with the EU. The chapter 
discusses (a) the differences and similarities in the ways Finland and Norway negotiate rules 
and regulations to suit their own visa regimes, and (b) the extent to which they can influence 
Schengen legislation. Throughout the chapter, the following questions will be addressed. 
• How can the countries, in theory, influence the Schengen framework?  
• How have Finland and Norway, in practice, managed to negotiate rules and 
regulations to shape their own visa regimes with Russia?  
• What are the outcomes of this, determined by their daily visa practices, and which 
experience can be seen as the most efficient? 
Chapter four accounts for the comparative analysis in chapter three and discusses the reasons 
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why Finland and Norway practice the CVP differently. Further, the chapter looks upon the 
consequences this may have on individual member states, let alone the Schengen Area as a 
whole. The underlying questions in this chapter will be as follows.  
• Why are the national visa policies in Finland and Norway different, and which factors 
can best explain these differences? 
• What are the consequences of each process for Finland and Norway on the national 
level, and for EU/Schengen on the supranational level?  
Finally, Chapter five will provide a summary of issues addressed in this study and present the 
main findings. The concluding argument of this thesis notably falls into a category close to 
some of the previous studies: Finland’s visa politics are relatively more efficient than 
Norway’s, and the best factor to explain this difference is Finland’s historical bordering 
traditions with Russia.  
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Chapter 2  
Background: From bordering traditions to de facto visa politics 
This chapter will present the background for the Schengen Agreement, followed by the 
background of Finland and Norway’s histories of bordering traditions, leading to their de 
facto visa politics. In order to understand the de facto visa politics among Schengen members, 
it is advantageous to examine the historical foundation on which this type of politics emerged. 
How have the Common External Borders evolved in the past few decades, what kind of 
events drove this process further, and how were the first “freedom of movement” rights 
introduced to European states? The goal of this chapter is to (a) explain the concept of 
bordering and its reflection in Finland and Norway’s de facto visa policies, (b) provide an 
historical overview of the Schengen Agreement and the resulting visa regimes, and (c) 
provide an historical overview of bordering traditions leading up to the de facto visa politics 
in Finland and Norway, respectively.  
 
2.1 The Concept of Bordering 
Contemporary border studies introduce the concept of bordering. In his State of the Art Report 
on the Euro Border Regions project Scott suggests that “bordering” – or the construction of 
borders – is not a finite process or a semi-permanent institutional arrangement. Instead, it is a 
multi-layered, everyday process that is realized through politics, cooperation, conflict, culture, 
media, stereotypes and, basically, most aspects of a society – internally as well as in relation 
with other societies.20 Scott suggests two ways of understanding bordering: the pragmatic 
approach and the critical approach. The first way involves “deriving generalizable 
knowledge from practices of border transcendence and confirmation”, while the second way 
involves “theorizing and questioning the conditions that give rise to border generating 
categories”.21 Both approaches have advantages for my research question. The pragmatic 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Scott, James Wesley (2012a). ”A State of the art report”.  Pp. 4-5. EUBORDERREGIONS . 
21 Scott (2012a), p. 5.	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approach can be useful in finding a logical pattern between historical events and everyday 
practices, explaining the politics that shaped present day visa regimes in the EU – generally – 
as well as in Finland and Norway – specifically. On the other hand, the pragmatic approach 
assumes that historical events and everyday practices are in fact generalizable, omitting the 
possibility of one factor or event having a greater effect on the outcome than the others. For 
this reason, the critical approach can be quite helpful in addition to the pragmatic approach. 
This way, every event is considered to be unique, allowing conditions to be theorized 
separately. In this empirical study, both approaches will thus be applied to the analysis of 
Finland and Norway’s border politics. 
 
2.2 Europe, Schengen and Visas 
Europe has arguably experienced an era of de-bordering: internal state borders have 
disappeared and the free movement of persons has been introduced.22 Nevertheless, the wider 
Europe has seen an emergence of geopolitical and symbolical barriers between the European 
Union and its exterior. The Schengen Agreement may have abolished one layer of borders (by 
removing internal passport controls), but it may not have abolished the others (by imposing 
visa obligations for third country travellers). As noted by Scott, the concept of bordering 
allows us to indicate sharp contours between the national politics of the past – such as the 
politics of the Second World War – and the “post-national” European identity politics of the 
present – such as the manipulation of border symbolisms by the EU in order to carry out its 
own agendas for community building.23  
2.2.1 Background 
Before the Schengen Agreement, travelling within Europe was not possible without a 
passport. However, there have been some exceptional cases of countries forming border 
unions. Among these was the case of the 1940’s Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Zaiotti, Ruben (2011). Cultures of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of European Frontiers. 
Chicago, 2011: The University of Chicago Press . 
 Dansci, Katalin (2008). Toward a rights-based post-national Union: EU integration and Schengen extension 
discourse 2003-2006. Newark, 2008: The State University of New Jersey Publishment, UMI Microform Edition. 
 Scott, Wesley (2012b). European Politics of Borders, Border Symbolism and Cross-Border Cooperation, 
Chapter 5 in Wilson, T. M. And Donnan, H. (2012). A Companion to Border Studies. Oxford, UK, 2012: Wiley-
Blackwell Publishing. 
23 Scott (2012a), p. 17.	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Luxembourg), where passport issuance and border checks were abolished24. Another case can 
be found further back in time. An explosion in tourism during the 1800s broke down the 
passport and visa system, resulting in the removal of passport requirements all over Europe by 
1914. However, security concerns during the First World War brought passport requirements 
back again.25 For the best part of the 20th century national border controls in Europe have 
been relatively strict, allowing every state to impose and control regulations on its own 
borderline.  
The process of integration, going hand in hand with the development of the modern state, 
encouraged leaders of the European Community to aim towards citizen freedom.26 The main 
changes that came with the Schengen Agreement were the abolishment of checks on persons 
crossing the internal borders of the Schengen area, enabling free movement for more than 400 
million Europeans, and the creation of a common external frontier.27 This implied that a 
Schengen citizen did not require a passport to travel within Europe, whereas a third country 
national required an entry visa. 
In order to get a better understanding of the Schengen visa system and how it works today, we 
need to examine how it was formed. What were the key events in the preceding decades, 
leading up to the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 1985? What was the legal framework 
behind the agreement, the Schengen Acquis28, and how much freedom was given to signatory 
states in order to negotiate laws and regulations in favor of their own visa regimes in the 
following decades?  
There are various events to which one may link the origins of the Schengen Agreement. One 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Joubert, Chantal & Hans Bevers (1996). Schengen Investigated. A Comparative Interpretation of the Schengen 
Provisions on International Police Cooperation in the Light of the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
Hague, Kluwer law International. (pp. 32-33).  
 Moch, Leslie Page (2003). Moving Europeans: Migration in Western Europe Since 1650, 2nd ed. Migration in 
the Twentieth Century (pp. 161-177). Indiana, Indiana University Press: 2003.  
25 Government of Canada (2013). ”History of Passports: Early Passports”.  Passport Canada. Last modified on 
July 25, 2012. URL: http://www.ppt.gc.ca/pptc/hist.aspx. Retrieved on February 25, 2013. 
  Salter, Mark B. (2003). Rights of Passage: The Passport in International Relations. London, Lynne Rienner 
Publishers: 2003. (pp. 23-33). 
26 Hix, Simon (2005). The Political System of the European Union, 2nd ed. Chapter 11: 344-46. The European 
Series. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan). 
27 European Commission (2013b). Europe of Free Movement: The Schengen Area. Home Affairs. (p.3). URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/pdf/flipbook/index.html. Retrieved on February 23, 2013.  
  Media Visa (2013). The Schengen visa portal. URL: http://www.mediavisa.net/schengen-area.php. Retrieved 
February 24, 2013. 
28 Schengen Aquis meaning the set of requirements and legislation applied to the member states of the Schengen 
Agreement (e.g. European Commission. Home Affairs, 2013: 6). 
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way is tracing it back to the 1980s, when the agreement was signed, while another is to go 
further back to the Treaty of Rome in 1957, when the fundamental objective for the European 
Economic Community (EEC) – the free movement of persons – was adopted.29 There is an 
advantage in choosing the latter approach, because The Treaty of Rome established the 
economic foundation on which facilitation of travel within the community came as a natural 
step.30 Originally, the provision on free movement of persons only applied to cross-border 
economic activity, whereas later legislation has extended the rights on entry, employment and 
residency for the member states. As Hix (2005) points out, the Treaty of Rome granted both 
EU citizens and non-EU Schengen nationals the rights to “seek work, reside and provide or 
receive a service in another member state”.31  
Several key events in the 1980s further developed the free movement of persons. With the 
Single European Act, entering into force in 1987 – arguably the most prominent of these 
events – the formation of the Internal Market was about to be completed, suggestively 
implying that an abolishment of border controls would soon have to be enacted.32 It is 
therefore not a surprise that two years earlier, in 1985, France, Benelux and Germany signed 
an agreement, followed by a Convention on its implementation in 1990, on the gradual 
creation of an inter-state territory without internal border checks. The territory became known 
as the Schengen area, based on the town in Luxembourg where the cooperation was founded. 
The main principle of the cooperation was free movement of persons, removal of internal 
border controls within the Schengen area, and a common external border, subject to the so-
called Schengen Visa Regime. 33  A Schengen Visa, as later defined by the European 
Commission, is “an authorization issued by a Schengen State with a view to transit through 
[…] the territory of the Schengen States [or their international airports’ transit areas].”34  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Hix, 2005: 348-50. 
30 Article 3 (c) stated that future activities of the EEC should, among other things, include ”the abolition, as 
between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for  persons, services and capital”. (Treaty of 
Rome, 25 March 1957: 4. URL: http://www.eurotreaties.com/rometreaty.pdf. Retrieved on February 24, 2013. 
31Hix, 2005: 348. 
In some cases, these rights also applied to some third-country nationals who either were married to, or were 
children of a EU citizen, as well as to a number of economically independent third-country nationals who do not 
pose a burden to the recipient country. In other cases, when the person in question is considered to be a threat, 
the recipient member state is allowed to deny his or her entry. The person in question may be a EU citizen as 
well as a non-EU national (The Treaty of Rome, 1957). 
32 Cini, Michelle (2007). European Union Politics. New York, Oxford University Press. (pp. 32-33).  
33 European Union External Action Service (2013). ”Schengen Agreement”. EEAS. Delegation of the European 
Union to Iceland. URL: 
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iceland/eu_iceland/schengen_agreement/index_en.htm. Retrieved on February 
24, 2013. 
34 Regulation (EC) No 810/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 establishing a 
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2.2.2 Extension 
When the first five members signed the Schengen Agreement, the cooperation functioned 
separately from the European Community. Twelve years later, in 1997, the Amsterdam Treaty 
incorporated it into the legal framework of the European Union. Two great changes were 
introduced at that time – Article 62 (1), on the adoption of “measures with a view to ensuring 
(…) the absence of any controls on persons (…) when crossing internal borders”35, and the 
protocol integrating 3000 pages of the Schengen Acquis into the EU framework. As the 
cooperation developed, the number of signatory countries rose, extending the Schengen area 
to include almost all of the EU member states, with the exception of the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Bulgaria, Romania and Cyprus. Norway and Iceland signed the agreement on May 
18, 1999, followed by Switzerland, which joined the Schengen area in 2008.36 Currently 
(2013) there are a total of 26 members of the Schengen area, of which 22 are also EU 
members and 4 are non-EU members.  
2.2.3 Schengen today and issues affecting visa policy 
A significant part of the Schengen framework is embedded in the Schengen Borders Code37, 
governing external border crossings and facilitating entry for persons with a legitimate 
interest for visiting the EU, and the Visa Code, which harmonizes the procedures and 
conditions for visa issuance.38 The organizational structure of the Schengen Agreement, with 
respect to visa policy, can be illustrated as follows. The EU Commission tops the governance 
system, while the Directorate-General for Home Affairs (DG Home Affairs) is responsible for 
the underlying border- and visa policies. Moreover, this is complemented by two central, 
information sharing mechanisms ensuring security of EU citizens and other travellers – the 
Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Visa Information System (VIS). These large-
scale, IT-based systems are intended to facilitate border management and visa issuance.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). URL: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32009R0810:EN:NOT. Retrieved on February 24, 2013. 
35 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). UNHCR. URL: http://www.unhcr.org/41b6ccc94.pdf. Retrieved on February 25, 
2013. 
36 See footnote 12.  
37 European Commission (2013). ”Schengen, borders & visas”. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-
we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/index_en.htm. Retrieved on February 24. 
38 European Union (2013). REGULATION (EC) No 810/2009 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF 
THE COUNCIL of 13 July 2009 establishing a Community Code on Visas (Visa Code). Official Journal of the 
European Union, 15.09.2009. URL: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:243:0001:0058:EN:PDF. Retrieved on February 25, 
2013.  
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An important advantage of the SIS is that it has made policing in Europe easier.39 The system 
enables wider cooperation among member states and the exchange of information, which 
facilitates crime tracking all over the Schengen area. Similarly, the VIS serves as an 
advantageous intelligence tool in visa issuance procedures, insuring the security of migration 
across Schengen’s external borders. However, the continuing empowerment of police and 
intelligence forces across the Schengen area also indicates that the level of organized crime is 
still increasing, despite security measures like the SIS and VIS. This situation creates a two-
fold dilemma: on the one hand, idealistic principles of European travel democracy carry 
freedom of movement and trade opportunities, but on the other, they gradually create a 
nurturing environment for international crime and subsequent security threats to the very 
opportunities it was meant to promote. 
Robert Fischer (2012) has pointed out other negative effects of the SIS and VIS, particularly 
the challenges they pose to law enforcement authorities and the bargaining of the Schengen 
Acquis. Because the systems lead to legal harmonization, individual countries’ law 
enforcement authorities have lost direct influence over their level of crime.40 In practice, 
various concepts of Europeanization, such as legal harmonization, pose a threat to the multi-
layered policy processes between states implementing the Schengen structure. It is therefore 
reasonable to say that “free movement of crime”, as well as the fragmented legal 
harmonization, are of great concern to Schengen signatories managing their respective visa-, 
bordering- and bargaining policies.  
Schengen’s external policy in relation to visas becomes a complex procedure as certain issues, 
linked to border control and security, are drawn to the fore. Examples of these are irregular 
migration, asylum issues, and regulation of long-term legal migration.41 Furthermore, certain 
global events have made a significant impact on the visa politics in the Schengen area. A 
central example was the terror attacks on September 11, 2001 – an event that changed the 
EU’s priorities, turning its attention towards new visa measurements with regard to security 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 BBC World Service (2013). ”Fortress Europe”. 
  Karanja, Stephen Kabera (2008). Transparency and Proportionality in the Schengen Information System and 
Border Control Cooperation. Leiden, 2008: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
40 Fisher, Robert (2012). ”The Europeanization of Migration Policy. The Schengen Acquis Between the 
Priorities of Legal Harmonization and Fragmentation”.  Europäische Hochschulschriften Reihe 31: 
Politikwissenschaft, European University Studies, Political Science and Theory, Frankfurt: 2012.  
41 Peers, Steve (2011). EU Justice and Home Affairs Law, 3rd ed. Chapter 4: “Visas” (pp. 226-294). Oxford EU 
Law Library. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.  
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issues.42 Because of the impact caused by some of these issues, visa policies ultimately 
become subject to changes in the legal framework and extended issuance procedures.  
2.2.4 A changing legal framework?  
In his EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (2011), Steve Peers illustrates a division between 
three phases in Schengen’s legal framework – one before the Treaty of Amsterdam (addressed 
earlier in this chapter), one with it, and one after it.43 Throughout most of the second phase, as 
well as the third, an ongoing dispute between the European Council and the Commission has 
repeatedly affected visa legislation. Some of the related issues have brought the framework 
forward because of the resulting legal developments in the Schengen framework.44 On the 
other hand, the problem of EU’s decision-making practices can be seen as a challenge to the 
development of the CVP. Issues like freedom to travel for third-country nationals have proven 
the Council unable to agree on any final amendment to the Schengen framework.45  
After the Treaty of Amsterdam some secondary visa rules were changed, directing policy 
further towards harmonization. For example, special visa regimes were established during the 
2004 and the 2006 Olympics. Also, a special visa agreement with Russia entered into force in 
2007.46   
The Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, adopted new legislation on visa policy. 
Firstly, it revised many of the old provisions and extended competences regarding a “common 
policy on visas and other short-stay residence permits.”47 Secondly, it extended the co-
decision process, renaming it “the ordinary legislative procedure.” Thirdly, the EU can now 
regulate the freedom to travel of third-country nationals within the EU within a shorter period 
of time, rather than the previous “three months” rule of the Amsterdam Treaty.48 Fourthly, the 
Treaty of Lisbon reformed the organizational system of the EU, establishing the DG Home 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Peers (2011). p. 231. 
43 Peers (2011). Chapter 4. 
44 For example, issues connected to the implementation of the Amsterdam Treaty (such as agreement on power 
over visa lists or ”blacklists”). 
45 Peers (2011). p.232 
46 European Commissin (2013a). AGREEMENT Between the European Community And the Russian Federation 
on the facilitation of the issuance of visas to the citizens of the European Union and the Russian Federation. 
URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/borders-and-visas/visa-policy/index_en.htm. 
Retrieved on February 2, 2013. 
47 Europedia (2013). ”Common treatment of nationals of third countries in the EU”. Last updated in 2011. URL: 
http://europedia.moussis.eu/books/Book_2/3/8/1/3/?all=1. Retrieved on February 4, 2013. 
48 Article 62(3) of the Treaty of Amsterdam.	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Affairs as the directorate responsible for the Schengen Agreement, borders and visa policies. 
As a result of issues affecting visa policies, as well as a changing legal framework, bargaining 
of the Schengen Aquis becomes a challenge for EU officials, let alone the individual member 
states. How much influence do states like Finland and Norway have on the Schengen 
framework to manage their respective visa regimes? The following sections give a 
background of the two countries’ bordering traditions, their relationship with the Schengen 
Agreement and finally, their national experiences with visa issuance vis-à-vis Russia.   
 
2.3 From Nordic to European: Finland and Norway’s bordering traditions and visa 
politics  
The Nordic forerunner of the modern Schengen Agreement was the Nordic Passport Union 
(NPU), a passport-free travel area established in 1958 by the member states of the Nordic 
Council.49 The NPU abolished all internal border checks on travellers, and was eventually 
integrated into the Schengen area.  
The Nordic Region, with countries like Finland, Norway and Sweden, has therefore been 
subject to the Nordic Cooperation as well as the Schengen Agreement. However, despite a 
common border union, Finland and Norway have ended up with different practices in their 
respective visa regimes towards the fourth member of the Barents Region – Russia. This 
section tempts to draw the lines between the past and the present by examining Finland and 
Norway’s bordering traditions, their cross-border practices with Russia, and their relationship 
with the Schengen system.  
2.3.1 Finland   
Bordering traditions in Finland during the last few centuries can be summed up as mainly 
Russia-oriented and transformable. During the 18th century, Finland played the role of a 
buffer zone between the rivaling states, Russia and Sweden, in the Northern War. In 1809, 
Finland was ceded to the Russian Empire and granted autonomy by the Russian tsar, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 The Nordic Council, established in 1952, was the first step towards creating a political cooperation between 
the Nordic states – Finland, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden and the Faroe Islands, Åland and Greenland. 
Source: Norden (2013). ”About the Nordic Co-operation” and ”History of the Nordic Council”, URL: 
http://www.norden.org/en/about-nordic-co-operation, and http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-council/the-nordic-
council/the-history-of-the-nordic-council/1953-1971. Retrieved on March 1, 2013.  
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Alexander I. The two countries established a close partnership throughout the century, but in 
the 20th century, attempts were made by Russia to tie Finland closer to the Empire by 
imposing Russian as the official language and integrating Finnish military units into the 
Russian army. Finland’s reaction was skeptical, causing strikes within the nation, and raising 
questions to whether this example of de-bordering was acceptable integration or not.50  
Finland continued fighting for its independence during the First and Second World Wars, 
along with a number of other wars, fought almost simultaneously, over the Finnish territory 
(the Winter War, the Continuation War against the USSR, and the Lapland War). Throughout 
this period, Finland’s relations with Sweden and the “West” improved, whereas the Finnish-
Russian relations remained relatively tense. Moreover, in 1939 the Soviet Union demanded 
revision of the Finnish southern border in Karelia in order to protect Leningrad.51 Finland was 
yet again playing the role of a buffer zone. Later, Karelia was divided between Finland and 
the Soviets, although the “Karelian Question” remains unresolved and a matter of public 
debate.52  
As relations with the Soviet Union loosened up, Finland joined the Nordic Cooperation. In 
1955 the Finnish parliament applied for membership in the Nordic Council, and later the 
NPU, abolishing checks on Finland’s border to Sweden and Norway. Around 1970, a 
proposal was passed at the Council’s Session in Reykjavik to negotiate a common Nordic 
economic cooperation, commonly known as the “Nordek plan.”53 However, because of the 
refound relations with the Soviet Union, Finland refused to ratify the treaty enabling its 
economic association with states like Norway, Sweden and Denmark.54 
Finland entered the Schengen cooperation in 2001.55 Moreover, Finland has been a member 
of the European Union since 1995. According to recent sources, Finnish border management 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Lavery, Jason Edward (2006). The History of Finland. Greenwood Publishing Group, Westport: 2006.  
51 Jowett, P & Brent Snodgrass (2006). Finland at War 1939-45. New York, 2006: Osprey Publishing. (pp. 3-5).  
52 Finnish Karelian League (2013). ”Karjalan Liitto (Karelia) – Briefly in English”. URL: 
http://www.karjalanliitto.fi/english. Retrieved on March 2, 2013.  
    Korablev, N (2013). ”From the History of Karelia”. The Republic of Karelia State Government Bodies’ 
Official Web Portal.  URL: http://www.gov.karelia.ru/gov/Different/History/history_story_e.html#01. Retrieved 
on March 2, 2013. 
53 Orava, Heidi (2013). 1953-1971. ”Finland Joins in and the first Nordic rights are formulated”.  Published at 
The Nordic Council:  The official inter-parliamentary body.  URL: http://www.norden.org/en/nordic-
council/the-nordic-council/the-history-of-the-nordic-council/1953-1971. Retrieved on March 2, 2013. 
54 Nielsson, Gunnar (1971). ”The Nordic and the Continental European Dimensions in Scandinavian Integration: 
NORDEK as a Case Study”.  University of Southern California. Cooperation and Conflict, March 1971. Vol 6, 
no. 1 (pp. 173-181).	  	  
55 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2013).  ”The Schengen Agreement and Norway”.  Mission to the EU 
(Norway House). URL:  http://www.eu-norway.org/Schengen_agreement/. Retrieved on March 2, 2013.  
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and visa practices have proven to be exemplary within the Schengen area, largely thanks to 
Finland’s history of bordering relations with Russia.  
2.3.2 Norway  
Bordering traditions in Norway can be traced back to several historical unions, such as the 
Kalmar Union, the union with Denmark and the union with Sweden. After 1905, when the 
Norwegian Storting proclaimed independence from Sweden, and during the two World Wars, 
Norway’s foreign relations were mainly associated with neutrality. Nevertheless, neutrality 
did not hinder Norway in joining the League of Nations in 1920 and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) in 1949, or co-founding the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
in 1959.56 Norway’s diplomatic relations with Finland began in the second decade of the 20th 
century, when both countries gained their independence and in the 1950s both countries 
became members of the NPU57.   
Norway’s relations with Russia have been peaceful throughout the last centuries. The two 
have never been at war against each other, though the Cold War period made cooperation 
with the Eastern neighbor difficult.58 The breakdown of the Soviet Union opened for new 
cooperation opportunities, eventually embarked by Norway in the “High North” politics.59 
Another central event in Norwegian bordering traditions was the establishment of the Barents 
Cooperation in 1993’s Kirkenes Declaration. According to Staalesen (2012), this introduced a 
“new arena for post-Cold War relations in a region of abundant national interests and 
militarization, as well as socio-economic and cultural divides”.60   
During the second half of the 20th century, the Barents Sea has played a central role in the 
Norwegian-Russian border-policy making.61 Politics of the Barents Sea between Norway and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Riste, Olav (2005). Norway’s Foreign Relations – a History. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 2005. 
57 Järviö, Pekka (2013). Interview with Pekka Järviö (Järviö Associates, Helsinki) about Finland’s membership 
in the Schengen cooperation. Dated April 11, 2013. By Elizaveta Vassilieva. 
58 Staalesen, Atle (2012a). ”Cross-Border Cooperation: The Norwegian-Russian Border” in Järviö, Staalesen et 
al. Ex Borea Lux? November 2012. 
59 The ”High North” referring to the area of strategic cooperation between the Norwegian state and the Russian 
Federation. See Government (2013) ”The High North”, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. URL: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/campaigns/the-high-north.html?id=450629. Retrieved on March 3, 2013.   
   Godzimirski, Jakub M. (2007). ”High Stakes in the High North. Russian-Norwegian relations and their 
Implications for the EU.” Russia/NIS Center, Paris, Russie. Nei. Visions, nr. 25 | 26 pages. Published at the 
Official website of the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, December 21, 2007.  
60 Staalesen (2012b). p. 29.	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Russia has been a disputed issue for the last 40 years. The disputed territory is rich on natural 
resources such as oil, gas and fish, making it subject to great economic and geopolitical 
interests.   
In 2012, The Norwegian Barents Secretariat published an annual review on the Barents 
cooperation, referring to two important agreements, reached between Norway and Russia in 
the past few years. One of these agreements was the 2010 “Barents Sea Compromise”, 
concerning the previously mentioned territorial dispute. The other was the Local Border 
Traffic Agreement, also signed in 2010, which opened for visa-free travelling for local 
“border citizens” in Norway and Russia. The review described the year 2010 as a historical 
breakthrough in northern visa politics, making Norway and Russia frontrunners of 
contemporary border relations between East and West Europe. 
“(…) Not only will the deals prepare the ground for cross-border development of 
offshore oil and gas resources in the Barents Sea, but they will also give the first 
regular Russian citizen since the 1920s the right to move across the border with a 
western European country without visa.” 62 
As for the Norwegian association with the Schengen Agreement, Norway became a full 
member in 2001, falling into the category of non-EU Schengen member states. With its 
history of public opposition of EU-membership, Norway’s foreign relations with Europe are 
mostly centered around the EEA Agreement, which entered into force on 1 January 1994.63 
The EEA Agreement links Norway with the Schengen Aquis. A Mixed Committee ensures 
full association, allowing Norway and other EEA states to participate in the Schengen 
Cooperation.64 Norway is also an active member of the European Frontex border agency since 
2005. 
In contrast to the Finnish visa regime, Norway is seen as one of Schengen’s most pedant 
members.65 According to the Barents Review, the Norwegian visa regime is extensively 
concerned with formalism and precision, making the issuance procedures more durable than, 
for instance, in Finland.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Staalesen, Atle (2012b). ”Crossing the border into new territories” in  Barents Review 2012 by The 
Norwegian Barents Secretariat, pp.11-12. Kirkenes, Norway: Dagfinn Hansens Trykkeri AS, 2012. 
63 The European Free Trade Association (2013). “EEA Agreement”. URL: http://www.efta.int/eea/eea-
agreement.aspx. Retrieved on March 3, 2013. 
64 Norway Mission to the EU (2013). ”The Schengen Agreement and Norway”. URL: http://www.eu-
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Summing up, this chapter has introduced the concept of bordering and its relevance for the 
Schengen visa politics. It has also presented the background for the Schengen agreement, 
including its legal framework, or the Schengen acquis, and some central issues affecting the 
CVP. Further, this chapter has demonstrated that part of the origins of the Schengen visa 
regime can be traced back to the Nordic Passport Union, a free-movement cooperation that 
involved both Finland and Norway before their entrance into the Schengen area. This means 
that when the two countries joined Schengen, they already had an experience in sharing a 
common external border, which suggests that both of them had relatively efficient visa 
practices. However, despite being close neighbors, Finland and Norway practice two rather 
different visa policy paths. Firstly, only one of them is currently a full member of the EU. 
Secondly, their entrance into the Schengen area occurred at different times. And finally, their 
executive visa practices vis-à-vis Russia are different. This further means that in order to 
answer the research question about how Finland and Norway negotiate on Schengen 
legislation, one would have to account for all of the underlying differences. The following 
chapter will thus examine these differences in detail and discuss their meaning.    
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Chapter 3  
National experiences in Finland and Norway: Executive visa 
practices, implementation of the Schengen Acquis and negotiation   
 
Finland and Norway are bound by the same visa legislation – from its formation in the EU’s 
intergovernmental negotiations to its application into national policies. This suggests that it is 
advantageous to evaluate negotiation practices in connection with the entire run of the 
Schengen acquis. This chapter compares Finland and Norway’s national practices concerning 
the CVP, divided into three levels – execution, implementation and negotiation. The first level 
compares executive visa practices, which involves visa issuance, cross-border traffic, 
facilitation of cross-border trade and cooperation, and security management. The second level 
looks at the implementation of Schengen legislation into national policy areas and, 
particularly, at three different regulations implemented by the case countries. The third level 
examines Finland and Norway’s negotiation practices, including their overall participation in 
the EU’s decision-making and their engagement in a few specific negotiation procedures 
treated in the past few years.  
 
The purpose of all three levels is to evaluate the degree of utilization of the Schengen acquis 
and the efficiency of the three practice categories. At the same time, the purpose is to discuss 
the extent of difference between Finland and Norway at all three levels. Levels one and two 
will look at the technical aspects of Finland and Norway’s visa regimes with Russia, building 
up to the final, connecting, level. The third level will primarily focus on the main research 
question, but at the same time draw connections to the first two levels of national practices. 
To sum up the three-level analysis, a concluding section will be provided at the end of this 
chapter. Here, the flexibility of the Schengen legal framework will also be evaluated and the 
so-called “Schengen exceptions” will be put to the test. 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Executive visa practices towards Russia  
As agreed between the respective signatories, it is important that all Schengen member states 
follow the common legislation provided in the agreement. For instance, the Schengen acquis 
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specify that a uniform Schengen visa to Finland, Norway or any other Schengen member “is 
valid for a period up to 90 days in any 180-day period from the date of entry in the Schengen 
Area.”66 It is, however, even more important for member states to achieve efficient executive 
practices suitable for their own national policy areas, which ultimately results in divergent 
visa policy approaches. The first central difference between Finland and Norway’s 
approaches can hence be observed in their organisational structures concerning-, and 
institutions responsible for, visas.  
 
In Finland, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFAF) holds the main responsibility for visas.67 
Operating under the MFAF is the Finnish Embassy, which handles visa-related cases outside 
of Finland, thereby in Russia. In Norway, on the other hand, the Ministry of Justice and 
Public Security is formally responsible for visas. The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration 
(UDI) performs the work related to visa issuance and ensures that the visa policies are 
practices in accordance with the current legal framework.68 Not all visa issuance procedures 
require the direct involvement and surveillance of the UDI. In most cases, visa applications 
are processed by the Foreign Service Mission (FSMN), which includes the Norwegian 
consulates and embassies located in Russia. This example demonstrates a significant 
difference in the fact that Norway’s organisational structure appears formally more complex 
than Finland’s, which suggests a similar complexity in Norway’s visa issuance procedures. 
Subsequently, this means that the Schengen framework allows for a certain degree of national 
freedom in terms of organisation and visa application processing.   
 
Another example where Finland and Norway differ in their executive visa practices can be 
illustrated by the visa services they provide and the types of visas they issue. According to the 
Finnish “Aliens Act” of 2004 (revised in 2010), Russian visitors may apply for five types of 
visas: single-, multiple-, and re-entry visas, as well as transit and airport transit visas.69 As for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Directorate of Immigration of Norway (2013a). ”Common information sheet on the rights and conditions, 
related to a uniform Schengen visa, mainly addressed to Russian citizens.” (p. 1). URL: 
http://www.norvegia.ru/PageFiles/425919/Common%20information%20sheet%20FINAL.pdf. (Retrieved on 
April 24, 2013). 
67 Immigration Service of Finland (2013). ”Visiting Finland (Visas).” Information elsewhere. Published on the 
Finnish Immigration Service’s official website, 2013. URL: 
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68 Directorate of Immigration of Norway (2013g). ”Utlendingsdirektoratets virksomhetsidé”. Published on the 
Directorate’s official website. Last updated on January 18, 2011. URL: http://www.udi.no/Om-
UDI/Utlendingsdirektoratets-virksomhetside/. (Retrieved on April 23, 2013). 
69 Ministry of the Interior of Finland (2013). ”Aliens Act (301/2004, amendments up to 1152/2010 included)”, 
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the Norwegian part, the UDI issues not only the same types of visas as Finland, but some 
other types as well. For example, Norway sometimes issues visas that are only valid within its 
national borders – the so-called “Visitor’s visa to Norway”.70 The Finnish equivalent for a 
national visa is a “regionally restricted visa”, which only applies in exceptional cases, mostly 
related to humanitarian reasons.71 Another category of visas issued by Norway is a special 
entry visa for foreigners who have been granted residence permit or a stay for a period 
exceeding 90 days.72 Moreover, the Norwegian constitution states that certain foreigners, who 
under normal circumstances require a visa, can entry Norway without a visa if the King 
makes an exception by regulation.73 Thus, the extent of difference in this area is also 
significant, as Norway issues more types of visas to Russians than Finland does. Nevertheless, 
as the following sections will demonstrate, this does not mean that Norway issues more visas 
than Finland, or that its cross-border traffic with Russia is more active. It does, however, 
show a broader utilization of the Schengen framework from Norway’s side. 
 
3.1.1 Cross-border traffic and visa issuance 
 
The numbers of Russians travelling to Finland and Norway have been increasing in the recent 
years. At Storskog/Boris Gleb, which is the only border crossing point between Norway and 
Russia, the registered number of border crossings went up from 109.030 in 2009 to 252.110 in 
2012.74 Moreover, as stated in a working group report from 2011, the Storskog border station 
is expecting the number to be around 400.000 by 2014.75 At the nine border-crossing points 
on the land border between Finland and Russia the aggregate number of crossings went up 	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70 Directorate of Immigration of Norway (2013b). ”Different types of visas”. URL: 
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apply-for/#visitorN. (Retrieved on April 25, 2013). 
71 ”Aliens Act” of Finland. 
72 Ministry of Labour of Norway (2013). ”Om lov om utlendingers adgang til riket og deres opphold her 
(utlendingsloven). 12. Visum.” Ot.prp. nr. 75 (2006-2007). URL: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ad/dok/regpubl/otprp/20062007/otprp-nr-75-2006-2007-/12.html?id=474444. 
(Retrieved on April 25, 2013). 
73 Government of Norway (2013). ”Lov av 15. mai 2008 nr. 35 om utlendingers adgang til riket og deres 
opphold her (utlendingsloven). § 9 Visumplikt og visumfrihet.” Published at the official website of the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. URL: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/AID/publikasjoner/lover_og_regler/2009/Utlendingsloven_2010.pdf. 
(Retrieved on April 25, 2013). 
74 Police Service of Norway (2013). ”Antall passeringer over Storskog grensekontrollsted desember 2012.” 
URL: https://www.politiimg.no/img/lokale_bilder/ostfinnmark/Bilde_1803_lrg.jpg. (Retrieved on March 26, 
2013). 
75 Storskog Border Station (2011). ”Storskog grensepasseringssted 2011-2014, rapport fra arbeidsgruppe”. 
March 16, 2011. (p. 8). 
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from 7.351.454 in 2009 to 11.985.129 in 2012.76 The rise in border-crossings is closely 
connected to the development of the visa issuance business and, particularly, the increased 
issuance of multiple entry visas. An important observation here is the correlation between the 
increased cross-border traffic and the increased number of new Schengen regulations 
facilitating visa issuance. 
 
For instance, the Norwegian-Russian visa regime have brought bordering practices forward 
by establishing special cross-border travel arrangements, such as the Pomor Visa (for 
applicants in the Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Regions), which offers multiple entries for a 
period of maximum five years, and the Border Resident Permit (for border residents)77, which 
enables visa-free travel within a zone of 30 km on each side of the Norwegian-Russian 
border). It may be difficult to know for sure whether the developments were the response to 
an already growing cross-border movement, or whether a growing cross-border movement 
was the direct result of these visa developments. However, this demonstrates that Norway has 
utilized the Schengen framework to a relatively high extent and in a very specific manner – 
one that separates it from the Finnish case. 
 
Norway issues most of its visas to Russia: in 2012 it granted about 52.000 visas to Russian 
applicants, which made out over 36% of the total number of visas granted by Norway the 
same year.78 The Norwegian consular presence for the purpose of receiving Schengen visa 
applications in Russia is restricted to three main locations and their subordinate districts – 
Moscow, St Petersburg and Murmansk.79 The FSMN is thereby less dispersed than the 
Finnish mission, which is also represented in Petrozavodsk. Applicants in other areas are 
serviced by so-called External Service Providers, which are either visa centers or tourist 
companies that preliminarily process visa applications and forward them to the consular 
institutions. In 2012 the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow issued 26.312 visas to Russian 
visitors, while the Norwegian General Consulates in Murmansk and St Petersburg issued 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76 The Finnish Border Guard (2013). ”Schengen external borderline traffic 2009-2012”. The Border Guard in 
Figures, border crossing. URL: http://www.raja.fi/guidelines/border_crossing/border_crossing_points. 
(Retrieved on April 24, 2013).  77	  The	  Border	  Residence	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78 Directorate of Immigration of Norway (2013e). ”Tabell 8: Besøksvisum innvilget i første instans etter 
statsborgerskap, 2012.” Statistics from the annual report on migration for 2012, “UDI: Migrasjon 2012. Fakta 
og analyse.” Published on the directorate’s official website on March 4, 2013. URL: 
http://www.udi.no/arsrapport2012/Statistikk/Tabell-8-Besoksvisum-innvilget-i-forste-instans-etter-
statsborgerskap-2012/. (Retrieved on April 24, 2013). 
79 Directorate of Immigration of Norway (2013a): 5-6.  
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around 20.603 and 4.890 visas, respectively.80 At least fifty percent of the total numbers of 
visas, issued by the General Consulate in Murmansk are Pomor Visas.81  
 
In contrast to Norway’s Local Border Traffic Agreement, Finland does not have same kind of 
bilateral visa-facilitation agreements with Russia. Instead, the Finnish visa regime towards 
Russia does not require invitations, which makes it easier for entering travellers to get a visa. 
Finland also issues multiple entry visas with a validation of six months with no requirement 
for a previous visa history (in any Schengen member state). For these reasons, many Russian 
applicants find it preferable to enter the Schengen Area with Finland, rather than Norway, as 
their recipient.82  
 
As a result, Finland holds the leading position among Schengen signatories when it comes to 
the number of issued visas. One third of all visas in the Schengen area today are issued by 
Finland (1.2 million in 2011).83 In 2009, the Finnish consulate in Murmansk issued a total of 
19.311 visas. A mere year later, the number went up to a total of 29.451 visas.84 Finland also 
has a visa issuance office in the Republic of Karelia. Here, Finland issued 59.000 visas in 
2010. This suggests that Finland also utilizes the Schengen framework in a special manner – 
by making visas generally more accessible to Russians. It is therefore reasonable to state that 
the case countries are somewhat different in their practical visa issuance approaches, but that 
their degree of utilization is rather similar, given that they both take special visa facilitation 
measures in their respective visa regimes with Russia.  
To further demonstrate the similarities, another example can be brought up. In order to cope 
with the increasing flow of visa applications, a relatively novel practice in both Finland and 
Norway is the use of outsourcing services from the international company VFS Global by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 Directorate of Immigration of Norway (2013f). ”Tabell 9: Besøksvisum innvilget i første instans etter 
vedtaksinstans, 2012.” Statistics from the annual report on migration for 2012, “UDI: Migrasjon 2012. Fakta og 
analyse.” Published on the directorate’s official website on March 4, 2013. URL: 
http://www.udi.no/arsrapport2012/Statistikk/Tabell-9-Besoksvisum-innvilget-i-forste-instans-etter-
vedtaksinstans-2012/. (Retrieved on April 24, 2013). 
81 Mugaas, Knut A. (2010). ”Murmansk fylke, samfunn og økonomi. Norsk næringsvirksomhet.” Annual report 
on economic development of Murmansk Oblast, written collaboratively by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (presented by the Consul of Commercial Affairs) and the department of Innovation Norway in Murmansk. 
Published in Vadsø, Norway, 2010. 
82 The Norwegian Barents Secretariat (2012): 37-38. 
83 Barents Observer (2013). ”One third of all Schengen visas are issued by Finland”. Borders. Published on 
December 5, 2012. URL: http://barentsobserver.com/en/borders/2012/12/one-third-all-schengen-visas-are-
issued-finland-05-12. Retrieved on March 3, 2013.  
84 The Norwegian Barents Secretariat (2012): 36. 
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opening Visa (application) centres in Russia.85 However, Finland currently has six visa 
centers in Russia, while Norway has one, which opened only recently because Norway had to 
undergo a number of additional formal procedures. 86  Finland thus has more years of 
experience in this field of practice, which can explain its high number of visa issuances.87  In 
addition to this difference, the Finnish visa centers generally have lower additional service 
fees for applicants, longer opening times and larger staffs than the Norwegian visa center in 
Murmansk.88  
 
The approximate processing times are 10 days in Finland and 3-10 days in Norway.89  
However, the processing time highly depends on the type of visa, number of entries and the 
duration of the stay(s). Having this in mind, the average duration for a visa procedure in 
Finland may take over two weeks, while in Norway the procedure may take around 20 days or 
more.90 In fact, Article 8 of the Local Border Traffic agreement between Norway and Russia 
holds that “the processing period can be extended to a maximum of 60 calendar days, as there 
may be need for an additional evaluation of the given application.”91 If a visa is rejected by 
Norway, the applicant may appeal within three weeks of the denial notification and the case 
will be reviewed by the UDI for a final determination. In Finland, visa rejection was not 
subject to appeal until 2011, when new legislation on the rights of visa applicants came into 
force.92 
 
3.1.2 Visa procedures and security management 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Jacobsen, Marit Egholm (2013). In a personal e-mail from the Visa Consul at the Norwegian General 
Consulate in Murmansk, Marit Egholm Jacobsen, dated March 15, 2013. 
86 Barents Observer (2013a). ”Finland opens more visa centers in Russia”. Published on March 12, 2013. URL: 
http://barentsobserver.com/en/borders/2013/03/finland-opens-more-visa-centers-russia-12-03 (Retrieved on 
April 24, 2013).  
87 Barentsnova (2013a).  Finnish visa center opened in Murmansk. Published on October 11, 2012. URL: 
http://barentsnova.com/node/2085. (Retrieved n March 24, 2013). 
88 Barentsnova (2013b). ”Visa center of Norway in Murmansk”. Published on January 14, 2013. URL: 
http://barentsnova.com/node/2202. (Retrieved on March 20, 2013). 
89 Information retrieved from the official web sites of the Finnish and Norwegian General Consulates, and 
Embassies, in Russia. 
90 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland, 2013a (URL: 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?nodeid=15717&contentlan=2&culture=en-US#Refusal), and the 
Directorate of Immigration of Norway, 2013d (URL: http://www.udi.no/arsrapport2012/Statistikk/Tabell-2-
Saksbehandlingstid-fordelt-pa-instans-2012/), on general visa procedures.  
91 Government of Norway (2010). ”Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the 
Government of the Russian Federation on facilitation of reciprocal traveling for border residents in the Kingdom 
of Norway and the Russian Federation.” November 2, 2012, Oslo. ”Article 8”, point 2. p. 6. 
92 Articles 47 and 48 of the EU Visa Code. 
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External border management on the Schengen’s periphery can be considered especially 
crucial because it involves tight standards for external border control and surveillance.93 In the 
post-Cold War age, cross border security concerns have changed in tact with the nature of 
security threats: from military to “multi-criminal” (smuggling of goods, narcotics trafficking, 
illegal migration etc.).94 Measures to prevent the current security threats are thus an equally 
important aspect of visa procedures in Finland and Norway, although they are practiced 
somewhat differently.  For instance, since both Finland and Norway issue visas that are valid 
for the entire Schengen area, their national authorities must ensure that an applicant is not 
registered in the SIS.95 Applicants who are subject to SIS registration cannot be granted a 
Schengen visa, although the Norwegian authorities sometimes make exceptions by granting 
national visas to such candidates.96  
  
As already mentioned in chapter two, Norway is extensively concerned with precision and 
formalism when it comes to visa procedures. The Norwegian government puts strict 
requirements on applicants – a single entry visa, for example, requires a long list of 
documentation, including an invitation, travel and medical insurance, an economic guarantee 
form, and a “previous visa history“.97 According to the Norwegian Police Service and the 
Barents Secretariat, the strict security measures have led to a relatively low crime rate across 
the Norwegian-Russian border, and, despite the increased cross-border traffic, “Russian 
visitors are underrepresented in the regional crime statistics”.98 Finland, as noted earlier, 
does not require invitations and is generally less pedant when it comes to documentation 
requirements. Nevertheless, this does not imply that Finland’s security measures to cross-
border scrutiny are lower than Norway’s. The notably long-distanced (1.269 km) Finnish-
Russian border is carefully scrutinized by the Finnish Border Guard, and as stated by 
Kononenko and Laine: Finland’s cross-border security measures are closely connected to 
their long tradition of functional cooperation with Russia since 1960, and its focus on “real” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Jones, Erik & Anand Menon (2012). The Oxford Handbook of the European Union, Chapter 43.5: External 
Border Management, pp. 620-621.Oxford, 2012: Oxford University Press. 
94 Andreas, Peter (2003). ”Redrawing the line. Borders and security in the Twenty-First Century”. (pp. 84-101). 
Journal of International Security. Fall 2003, Vol. 28, No. 2, Pages 78-111. Massachusetts, 2003: Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology Press. 
95 Implying that the applicant has a criminal record and is hence excpelled from entering the Schengen area or 
parts of it. 
96 Directorate of Immigration of Norway (2013c). ”Schengensamarbeidet”. Last updated on December 12, 2011. 
URL: http://www.udi.no/templates/Page.aspx?id=2843 (Retrieved on April 27). 
97 Norway’s Official Website Abroad (2013). “Visum til Norge”. URL: http://www.norvegia.ru/Norsk/Reise-til-
Norge/.  
98 The Norwegian Barents Secretariat (2012): 39. 
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borders.99   
Overall, Finland and Norway’s executive visa practices towards Russia can be described as 
very different. The difference can be illustrated by the organisation of their visa policy 
responsibilities, the types of visas they issue, their issuance procedures and the number of 
visitors they circulate, and last but not least by their security measures. Due to its simplified 
documentation requirements, their widely dispersed visa centres across Russia, and their 
drastic numbers of visa issuances, Finland can be stated to take the leading position in 
executive efficiency. As noted by Järviö et al:   
 
 “[t]he Finnish Border Guard is widely seen as the most efficient border service on 
the EU’s external border. Finland has extensive experience in cooperating with 
Russia to make their shared border arguably the safest and best-managed in the 
Schengen area despite a considerable increase in the volume of border crossings”.100 
Due to its successful border practices, Finland has been used as an example for other 
Schengen states. Suggestively, the key to Finland’s success is the strict application of the 
Schengen codes, advanced use of technology, flexibility, and a well-established model for 
cross-border cooperation with Russia101. Norway, on the other hand, issues fewer visas than 
Finland, has more complex issuance procedures and uses less external outsourcing services. 
However, Norway can be seen as more flexible in in its bilateral visa relations with Russia, 
which is demonstrated by the agreement on the Border Citizen Permit and the Pomor Visa. 
Finland may have a better visa accessibility and a higher number of visa centers, but it does 
not have a visa-free border zone – a development that can be seen as more important with 
regard to the “common steps towards visa freedom”. Also, Norway seems to take a more 
liberal approach to the types of visas it issues, illustrated by the national “Visitor’s visa to 
Norway” and the visas for Russians who have been granted stays exceeding the normal 90-
day period. Taking these matters in account, the following sub-chapter will compare Finland 
and Norway’s implementations of the Schengen acquis. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99 Kononenko, Vadim and Jussi Laine (2008). ”Assessment of the Finnish-Russian Border. The case of Vaalimaa 
Border Crossing Point.” 57 Working Papers 2008. The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. (p. 15). 
100 Järviö, Pekka (2012). ”Border management on the Finnish-Russian border”, p. 34 in Järviö, P., Staalesen, A. 
et al.s Ex Borea Lux. Learning From the Finnish and Norwegian Experience of Cross-Border Cooperation With 
Eastern Neighbours. Prague, 2012: Institute of Stability and Development.  
101 The Norwegian Barents Secretariat (2012): 36-38. 
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3.2 Implementation of the Schengen Aquis 
Compared to the previous level of comparison, this level looks more closely at the ways in 
which Finland and Norway interpret and implement the Schengen acquis. According to what 
the executive visa practices suggestively indicate, Norway appears to utilize certain Schengen 
acquis more liberally than Finland. The following pages will examine whether this is the case 
for other areas of the Schengen CVP. More specifically, a comparison will be made between 
the EU Visa Code (in light of the EC’s instructions, provided in the handbook on visa 
applications and the handbook on organization of visa sections), the Finnish “Alien’s Act” 
and the Norwegian “Foreigner’s Law” (Utlendingsloven). 
 
To ensure an optimal use of the Schengen rules and regulation, particularly the EU Visa 
Code, the European Commission (EC) has provided a set of common instructions on 
implementation, including factual information on how to perform the tasks related to visa 
issuance102. The instructions are presented in two main handbooks. The first one is the 
“Handbook for the processing of visa applications and the modification of issued visas”, 
which gives member states and associated states (non-EU members) the general guidelines on 
application of visa issuance procedures, visa facilitation agreements with certain third 
countries, visa types and national long-stay visas into national policies.103 The second one is 
the “Handbook for the organization of visa sections and local Schengen cooperation.”104 
According to the Handbooks and the Visa Code, the CVP applies equally to the entire 
territory of Finland, whereas in Norway’s case it only applies to the mainland territory, 
excluding Svalbard (Spitsbergen).  
 
Arguably, the most apparent example demonstrating the implementation difference between 
Finland and Norway is the application of bilateral VFAs and thus the Local Border Traffic 
Regime. In contrast to Finland, Norway is one of three Schengen states, which have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 European Commission (2010a). ”Commission decision of 19.3.2010 on establishing the Handbook for the 
processing of visa applications and the modification of issued visas.” Brussels, 19.3.2010 C (2010) 1620 final. 
URL: http://konzuliszolgalat.kormany.hu/download/5/2b/50000/ENvisahandbook.pdf (Retrieved on April 21, 
2013). 
103 European Commission (2011). ”CONSOLIDATED version of the Handbook for the processing of visa 
applications and the modification of issued visas”. Based on the COMMISSION DECISION C(2010) 1620 final 
and the COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING DECISION C (2011) 5501 final. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
affairs/policies/borders/docs/c_2010_1620_en.pdf. (Retrieved on April 21, 2013). 
104 European Commission (2010b). ” Handbook for the organisation of visa sections and local Schengen 
Cooperation”. COMMISSION DECISION of 11.6.2010. URL: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-
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concluded a bilateral VFA with Russia.105 Another example where Finland and Norway 
implement the CVP differently regards the issuance procedures and the underlying 
application requirements. Firstly, the absence of the invitation requirement in the Finnish 
practices can be considered an indication. Secondly, the national conditions for issuing visas 
to a given applicant are somewhat different. Compared to Finland, the Norwegian constitution 
can make exceptions from visa obligations in cases where the King has decided so.106 The 
relevance of these exceptions is, however, minimal. Exceptions could, in fact, be made in 
Finland as well, such as in the case of the restricted regional visa issuance. 
 
As for other aspects of the CVP, Finland and Norway have rather similar implementation 
practices. For instance, according to Article 6 of the Visa Code, “an application shall be 
examined and decided on by the consulate of the competent Member State in whose 
jurisdiction the applicant legally resides.” In practice, both Finland and Norway have taken a 
liberal approach to this rule by accepting visa applications also from so-called “non-residing 
applicants”. This means that applicants who normally reside outside a consulate’s jurisdiction, 
but are (temporarily) legally present within the jurisdiction, have the right to submit 
applications to the given consulate. 
 
In the meanwhile, Kononenko and Laine point out an interesting fact about the Finnish 
implementation of Schengen. Despite the common protocols and guidelines that came with 
Schengen, their full implementation has not led to any significant changes of the Finnish visa 
policy.107 This is, more or less, the case in Norway as well. Nevertheless, in the current visa 
legislation, the Finnish interests are suggestively more represented because Finland took a 
central part in the preparation of the initial Schengen legal framework during the 1990s.108 
 
3.3 Comparing the national experiences of negotiation with the EU  
So in what way do Finland and Norway negotiate with the EU on Schengen rules and 
regulations? In order to compare Finland and Norway’s negotiation practices in light of the 
executive and implementation practices, we first need to examine the formal conditions on 
which each of them participates in the Schengen-related EU negotiations.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105 European Commission (2010a): 12. 
106 ”Foreigner’s Law”: 6. 
107 Kononenko and Laine (2008): 8. 108	  Järviö	  (2013).	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Ever since the Schengen Agreement was integrated into the EU’s constitution, the Schengen 
acquis have been under gradual development.109 A new body of laws and regulations with a 
special autonomous status has been formed by intergovernmental negotiation. At the 
operational level, systems like SIS, VIS and the Frontex Agency have been created. At the 
procedural level, new provisions have been added to the Schengen Visa Code. Moreover, the 
supranational and national bilateral Visa Facilitation Agreements (VFAs) have been 
concluded with third countries like Russia. As new member states have joined the Schengen 
area, the scope of negotiations and the decision-making process itself became subject to 
development (e.g., an important change came with the Treaty of Lisbon and the abolishment 
of the pillar system of Schengen governance).  
 
3.3.1 General conditions for participation and negotiation  
 
One of the main intentions behind the merging of Schengen and the EU was to achieve a form 
of “closer cooperation between member states”, implying that member states like Finland and 
associate states like Norway would be able to take almost equally active participation in the 
EU’s negotiations on the development of Schengen legislation.110 In practice, this means that 
Norway’s association with the EU through the Schengen cooperation gives it full participation 
access to the European Council’s decision-making procedures, except from the right to 
vote.111 Since its entrance into the Schengen cooperation, Norway has been a part of the 
discussion on new Schengen legislation from the working group level to the ministerial level. 
In fact, the Schengen Agreement is the only EU-Norway cooperation where Norway is 
involved in the EU’s decision-making virtually at the same level as its fully integrated 
members.112 The 2012 Europe Review points out that Norway is becoming more and more 
“European”, given that it is increasingly more involved in the EUs developments.113  
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The Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) forms the grounds for the 
Schengen acquis, which consist of approximately 300 acts, including the visa policy 
domain.114 According to the Norwegian Counsellor of Migration, around 20 of these acts have 
been processed in the past few years and several of these were connected to the CVP. The 
process usually begins with a proposal from the EC or a member state. Then a series of 
negotiation rounds is conducted at the senior official level in working groups, expert 
committees and between ministers.115 When the negotiations are finished, the Council reaches 
a decision on the legislation proposal (the Council either makes the decision independently or 
in consultation with the EP).116 
 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the participation conditions of the EU member states (including Finland) 
and Norway, and the different stages of the decision-making process for Schengen. The figure 
also indicates that, in principal, Norway and Finland have very similar opportunities to 
influence new Schengen legislation to shape their individual visa regimes towards Russia. 
However, an important aspect here is that the EU’s negotiations on VFAs or visa exceptions 
with third countries are sectioned under the EU’s Foreign Policy branch, and is therefore 
conducted separately from the Visa Policy branch. This means that the conditions for 
Norway’s participation in the VFA area are not covered by the association agreement (on 
Norway’s Schengen membership) and that Norway’s chances on formally influencing the 
EU’s supranational VFAs with Russia are minimal. For instance, in the current EU-Russia 
talks on visa liberalization as well as the “common steps” towards visa freedom, which would 
ultimately affect the entire Schengen area, Finland’s interests are more likely to be accounted 
for than Norway’s.  
 
Figure 3.1: Participation in the EU’s decision-making process regarding new Schengen 
legislation117 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114 European Parliament (2013): 3. 
115 The Mixed Committee. 
116 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway (2013). ”Om gjennomføring av europapolitikken” The Storting White 
Paper No. 23 (2005-2006). Section 3.2.3 ”Hovedinnholdet i Schengen-samarbeidet.” URL: 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/dok/regpubl/stmeld/20052006/stmeld-nr-23-2005-2006-/3.html?id=200827 
(Retrieved on February 25, 2013).  
117 (Ibid.). 
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3.3.2 The Schengen acquis: “common steps” towards Finnish visa practices   
 
General participation conditions make up one aspect where national negotiation practices can 
be compared. However, a better understanding of the subject can be achieved by examining 
specific legislation cases where Finland and Norway took part in during the past years.    
 
Finland’s negotiation experiences in the Schengen Cooperation have been very important for 
the development of the Schengen legal framework, particularly for its early preparation 
stages. In the late 1990s the EC played mainly an observatory role in the negotiations, while 
common decision-making was still a relatively young and strictly intergovernmental matter. 
According to Pekka Järviö – who was involved in the Schengen Central Group and the 
Schengen Evaluation Working Group – when Finland first entered the negotiations shaping 
the Schengen Cooperation, in 1996, it raised concerns among the other EU members.118 
Finland was the only EU member who shared a border with (post-Soviet) Russia, which, at 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Järviö, Pekka (2013). ”Interview with Pekka Järviö (Järviö Associates, Helsinki) about the Finnish 
negotiation experiences in the Schengen cooperation.” Dated April 11, 2013. By Elizaveta Vassilieva. 
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the time went through a political crisis. A concern that the chaotic situation in Russia could 
lead to cross-border crime and illegal immigration, strongly affected the early Schengen 
negotiations. However, Finland managed to present its border security with Russia in such a 
way that not only allayed these concerns, but also shaped an important foundation for the 
upcoming border regulation framework. A challenging issue in these negotiations was to 
maintain the NPU within the Schengen cooperation, given that some of its countries were not 
EU members. This problem was eventually solved by an extensive risk analysis and the 
following inclusion of countries like Norway into the Schengen area119.  
 
Despite its lack of the personnel’s customer service and language skills, Finland continues to 
be acknowledged for its competence in external border control. 120 It is widely seen as a 
respected, reliable and exemplary negotiator, which in turn strengthens the Finnish influence 
of the content in the Schengen acquis. Because a significant part of the Schengen acquis is 
based on the Finnish traditional cross-border principles, the main aspects of the Finnish-
Russian visa regime have not changed since the “pre-Schengen” time. As noted by Järviö, 
Schengen obviously brought a number of technical adjustments to the traditional Finnish visa 
rules, but the main aspects of the Finnish visa practices towards Russia remained.121 It is 
therefore more correct to say that Finland does not negotiate with Schengen, but rather takes 
part in negotiations as one of the Schengen signatories, implying that intergovernmentalism is 
still an important aspect of the Schengen cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
3.3.3 “Outside and inside”: Norway’s negotiation practices in Schengen 
 
Norway is often referred to as an awkward partner of the EU – being both “outside and 
inside” of the EU.122 It is “inside” because of its active participation in several of the EU’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 (Ibid.) 
120 Kauppinen, Perttu (2005). ”Finnish border control among best in EU. Reduction of Russian border guards 
will not mean more work for Finland.” Helsignin Sanomat. International Edition – Foreign. URL: 
http://www.hs.fi/english/article/Finnish+border+control+among+best+in+EU/1101981791539 (Retrieved on 
April 27, 2013). 
121 Järviö (2013).	  
122 European Voice (2013). ”Norway. On the outside, looking in.” Published on  January 26, 2012. URL: 
http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/on-the-outside-looking-in/73334.aspx (Retrieved on April 27, 
2013). 
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projects, including the EEA agreement, which obliges Norway to adopt the laws of the 
Common Market. But it is “outside” because, despite Norway’s engagement in the European 
integration process, it is not a formal member. The Schengen cooperation clearly constitutes a 
case where Norway is as “inside” as it gets. However, given that Norway is a non-EU 
member, it has become more experienced in the informal ways of affecting EU legislation, 
which suggestively means that it has established an acknowledged presence in the overall 
European negotiation arena and thus a grater chance of influencing it. In the Schengen 
cooperation these chances are even greater than in other Norwegian association agreements 
with the EU.  
 
The general interests of Norway, being an intergovernmental negotiator in the Schengen 
cooperation, are to be part of a greater European free travel area, as to ensure that its 
participation can be guarded from any potential security threats. Similar to Finland, Norway 
wanted the NPU to be integrated into the Schengen area. As concerns Russia, Norway seems 
to be positive about the provisions of the local border traffic agreement and, moreover, about 
a “future with no visas”. 123  As the Finnish example has demonstrated, the Schengen 
cooperation is still highly intergovernmental. Even though Norway did not participate in the 
preparations of the Schengen acquis, it did get to influence many of its later adjustments.  
  
The agreement on the Border Citizen Permit between Norway and Russia originated from the 
2006 EC Regulation on local border traffic at external land borders, in which Norway took 
part.124 A similar agreement on a visa free border zone has been concluded between Poland 
and Russia. When Poland wanted to extend its local border zone, the proposal was brought 
into discussion as a legislative amendment. Norway also took part in these negotiations at 
senior official level, which ultimately lead to the amendment including the Kaliningrad area 
into the border zone.125  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123 As expressed by Foreign Minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre at the official meeting with Sergei Lavrov, 
October 2, 2010. The official signing of the Norwegian-Russian Local Border Agreement (Border Citizen 
Permit). Source: NRK (2013). 
124 Europa (2013). ”Local border traffic at external land borders.” Summaries of EU Legislation. Last updated on 
August 29, 2011. URL: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigrati
on/l14506_en.htm (Retrieved on April 27, 2013). 
125 European Commission (2011). ”Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending 
Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 as regards the inclusion of the Kaliningrad area and certain Polish administrative 
districts in the eligible border area.” Brussels, 27.7.2011 COM(2011) 461 final, 2011/0199 (COD). URL: 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0461:FIN:EN:PDF (Retrieved on April 27, 
2013). 
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As a non-EU member state, Norway has less formal influence in influencing the Schengen 
acquis than Finland. Firstly, if Norway would decide not to accept a new Schengen law, the 
remaining option would be to leave the cooperation. Secondly, the EU reviews Norway’s 
management of external border control as deficient, compared to Finland’s. As reported by 
the Barents Observer, the EU’s 2006 Schengen Evaluation of Norway’s border controls stated 
that:  
 
“[…] conscripts guarding the border to Russia are not to be regarded as professional 
border guards, since they are just doing their military service and not a real 
profession [and that] Norway was recommended to improve the human and material 
for guarding the border.”126  
 
Considering the fact that Finland’s border security reputation is important for the efficiency of 
its negotiation practices, Norway’s negotiation practices can be described as relatively weak. 
However this does not need to be the case and, as suggested by Järviö, “in practice there is 
probably not a great deal of difference [between the influences of Finland and Norway].”127  
 
 
3.4 Conclusions on the national experiences: How flexible is the Schengen legal 
framework? 
 
This chapter has examined national visa practices at three different levels. It has argued that 
there is a significant difference between Finland and Norway at the executive level – their 
authorities responsible for visa issuance are organised differently, the types of visas they issue 
to Russians are different, and the duration of their national application processes is different 
for each country. Some similarities can be mentioned, such as the fact that both countries 
increasingly use outsourcing services, but these similarities do not outweigh the differences. 
At the implementation level the national experiences can also be deemed different. Norway 
arguably utilizes the Schengen acquis more liberally than Finland, applying common rules to 
different policy areas, such as the VFA example has demonstrated.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 Barents Observer (2013c). ”Norway to continue with military border guards.” Published on September 24, 
2009. URL: http://barentsobserver.com/en/news/norway-continue-military-border-guards (Retrieved on April 
28, 2013). 
127 Järviö (2013).	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As for the negotiation level, an important finding is that Finland has managed to influence the 
Schengen legal framework to a greater extent than Norway. Formally, Finland and Norway 
have equal opportunities to influence Schengen developments by means of intergovernmental 
negotiations. Nevertheless, Finland has influenced the Schengen framework to a significant 
extent during the 1990s, largely thanks to its relations with Russia. Norway, on the other 
hand, did not have the same opportunity to influence the preparation of there rules, but has 
been able to influence some of the later developments. It is, however, difficult to establish just 
how many of these adjustments Norway actually got to influence, and to what extent so. The 
problem is that meeting documents rarely provide such information in detail unless one 
country’s influence was of particular common concern (as it was with Finland in the post-
Cold War period during the 1990s). This leaves one to assume that Norway’s influence in the 
Schengen developments has not been as great at Finland’s. 
 
Consequently, the overall assessment for this chapter would be that there are significant 
differences on all three CVP levels, which means that national approaches to negotiation 
practices and the shaping of visa policies have a strong appearance in the Schengen 
cooperation. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the Schengen legal framework is indeed 
flexible, and adaptable to certain national preferences, or the so-called Schengen exceptions.     
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Understanding the logic of divergent visa practices: a multi-
dimensional perspective  
 
The awareness of national visa practices an their differences is important because it gives an 
insight on how states negotiate on, interpret and utilize the Schengen Agreement. The 
previous chapter has managed to provide this by establishing that there are evident differences 
between CVP practices in Finland and Norway, although these differences vary in degree 
depending on the level of practice. However, a better, and arguably more valid, understanding 
of the national differences can be achieved by examining which societal aspects can justify 
them. In this chapter, I will therefore attempt to find the best explanation for why the Finnish 
and Norwegian CVP practices are different by setting them up against four explanatory 
factors: culture, economy, security and historical bordering traditions.  
The choice of factors can be supported by the fact that each of them illustrates a potential 
explanation to the divergent visa practices, in general, and negotiation practices, in particular. 
For instance, culture forms the identity and mentality of a country, which, in turn, affects the 
way national governments (including their subordinate institutions) practice different policies 
and behave in negotiations. Economy can be equally important in explaining the logic of 
national visa practices – considering, for instance, the connection between the growing 
number of visa issuances on the one hand, and the strengthening of local economies in 
subsequent border regions on the other. As already mentioned in the previous chapters, one of 
the main concerns that come with visa policy and the freedom of movement is security, thus 
making different security experiences of Finland and Norway a potential explanation to their 
divergent visa practices. Finally, a great deal could be explained by each country’s history of 
bordering traditions (described more closely in chapter two), particularly by the historical 
cross-border relations between Finland and Russia, as opposed to those between Norway and 
Russia. 
 
The following sections will discuss these matters in more detail in order to determine which 
factor has the strongest explanatory power with regard to my main research question. 
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4.1 Culture as the explanatory factor 
 
Arguably, many of the political differences between Finland and Norway can be explained by 
their national cultures, which is the first explanatory factor in my analysis. One may argue 
that Finland is different from Norway in its national mentality and that this is clearly reflected 
in its visa practices in general, and visa issuance procedures in particular. As demonstrated in 
chapter three, Finland tends to be relatively strict and thorough when it comes to 
implementation of the Schengen acquis and visa issuance. At the same time, Finland 
generally appears to be more pragmatic in its relation towards Russian visa applicants, as it 
spends less time processing visa applications, requires no invitations, and provides good visa 
services. This pattern evidently demonstrates the Finnish nature and values, which, according 
to Richard Lewis, are based on traits like decisiveness, pragmatism, reliability, trust of 
perception, task orientation and concept of service.128 Moreover, as pointed out by Lewis, the 
Finnish managerial style differs from the other Northern Europeans because of the “strong 
reactive element”, including traits like shyness, introversion, modesty, humbleness and 
respect for others – a nature often associated with Eastern countries such as Japan, rather than 
European.129 These cultural characteristics give Finland an innate capacity to adapt to 
fluctuating market conditions, notably across the Russian border, which in turn influences 
Finland’s visa practices. An example that clearly illustrates this is that Finland, over the past 
few years, has adapted to the Russian market by expanding its visa issuance services with 
more visa centers than Norway. Moreover, the mentioned characteristics permeate Finland’s 
behaviour in negotiations on the Schengen developments, suggestively making it appear as a 
humble, reliable, and relatively influential, negotiator – which can explain why Finland took 
such a central part in the preparations of the Schengen acquis in the 1990s.  
 
Culture can also explain the Norwegian way of negotiating on the Schengen acquis, as can be 
said about Norway’s visa practices in general. As The Europe Review puts it, the Norwegian 
cultural identity is best described with the Lipset-Rokkan model on social cleavages – it is 
wealthy, well organized, yet surrounded by “an undifferentiated sea of differentness”.130 The 
traditional “yes-no” position on EU-membership clearly demonstrates a feature of public 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128 Lewis, Richard D. (2005). Finland, Cultural Lone Wolf, 1st ed. Published by Intercultural Press, a Nicholas 
Brealey Publishing Company, 2005: London, UK. Printed in Finland by WS Bookwell. 
129 Lewis (2005): 95-97. 
130 Hylland Eriksen, Thomas & Iver B. Neumann (2011). ”Norsk identitet og Europa”. From the series of reports 
constituting The Europe Review. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway, NOU 2012. 
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indecisiveness, but also a sense of “reservedness” towards Europe and an unwillingness to 
give up common habits – as Europe, in the eyes of Norwegians, appears to be something 
“woolly, vague and unimportant.”131 Many of these features can thus be linked to Norway’s 
national visa practices. For instance, the fact that Norway is extensively concerned with 
formalism reflects its tendency of being “reserved”, and the relatively time-consuming visa 
issuance procedures suggestively demonstrates the trait of indecisiveness, a greater trust in 
non-harmonized national principles regarding visa policies, and an emphasis on the related 
institutions processing visa applications.  
 
The examples above illustrate that culture is a crucial factor when explaining the differences 
in national visa practices. However, this is not always the case. Firstly, culture cannot explain 
why Norway concluded the bilateral VFA with Russia, arguably bringing the practice of CVP 
a step further, whereas Finland did not. Considering the Finnish “pragmatism” and “trust of 
perception” as opposed to Norwegian “reservedness”, it would be more likely that Finland 
would be first to conclude a Local Border Traffic Agreement with Russia. Secondly, culture 
cannot directly explain the differences in negotiation practices. Whereas culture may be a 
component of the national interests represented in negotiations, it does not have a direct 
impact on the way in which these negotiations are conducted in practice. For instance, a 
central difference between the Finnish and Norwegian negotiation practices is the fact that 
Finland, in contrast to Norway, took part in the Schengen negotiations at a relatively early 
stage, thus having the opportunity to influence the Schengen acquis in its very formation. 
Therefore, it would be more reasonable to suggest that this is a difference of circumstances, 
rather than a cultural difference. In fact, “circumstance” can serve as a valuable explanation 
factor, although it is a relatively vague term, which needs to be specified more carefully in 
order to explain the logic of divergent visa practices.  
 
Suggestively, a circumstance can be interpreted as political issues that affect national 
governments, their behaviour and strategies, and the resulting policies or practices. Such 
issues can, for instance, be related to economy and security. Moreover, a circumstance can be 
interpreted as a historical event directly affecting the way in which the CVP is practiced in 
one country, as opposed to another. The following sections will therefore discuss how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Hylland & Neumann (2011): 5.	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political issues (economy and security, in particular) and historical events affect the course of 
the divergent visa practices of Finland and Norway. 
 
 
4.2 Economy as the explanatory factor 
In his speech after the Russian WTO accession in 2012, the European Commissioner for 
Trade, Karel De Gucht, expressed the EU’s prospects on future trade relations with Russia.  
 
“As two global scale markets on each other's doorsteps, Russia and the European 
Union are pulled together by economic gravity. Even when we have differences we 
will always be close partners. […] That is why Europe's interest – as well as our 
desire – is for the closest economic ties possible with a dynamic and successful 
Russia.” 132 
 
The statement above clearly illustrates that the economic significance of international trade 
between Europe and Russia is growing, and that measures must be taken by both parts in 
order to ensure a successful cooperation in this field. One of these measures has been the 
European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which seeks to enhance “people-to-
people cooperation” and, subsequently, “economic gravity” with third countries like 
Russia. 133  Since cross-border movement directly affects people-to-people contact, it is 
reasonable to assume that visa policies in Finland and Norway are, to some extent, driven by 
their foreign trade relations and economic activity vis-à-vis Russia. Thus, the differences in 
the national visa practices can be explained by the differences in Finland and Norway’s 
economic relations with Russia. 
 
In the past decade, Russia has been the number one growing export market for Finland, most 
notably in the field of tourism.134 For example, Russians make the largest tourist group in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132 European Commission (2012). ”Speech after WTO Accession: Reform and EU-Russia Trade Relations” by 
the European Commissioner for Trade, Karel De Gucht. December 5, 2012. SPEECH/12/901. URL: 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-901_en.htm (Retrieved on May 8, 2013).  
133 ”European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument: Cross-Border Cooperation.” European Commission 
Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2010. URL: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/country/enpi_cross-border_cooperation_strategy_paper_en.pdf (Retrieved on 
May 8, 2013).	  
134 Jakosuo, Katri (2011). ”Russia and the Russian tourist in Finnish tourism strategies – the case of the Karelian 
Region.” Lathi University of Applied Sciences, Finland. (p.1). 
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Finland (about 38% in 2012, by guest nights),135 whereas in Norway the share of Russian 
tourists is considerably smaller (about 0,4% in 2012).136 Thus, a possible explanation to why 
Finland issues more visas than Norway is that the economic utility of border crossings is 
higher for Finland. This further suggests that it is advantageous for Finland to make visas 
more accessible to Russians, for instance, by having shorter issuance procedures, invitation-
free requirements, and many visa centers.  
 
Furthermore, this can also explain why Norway chose to conclude a Local Border Traffic 
Agreement with Russia, rather than following the Finnish example of general “visa 
accessibility” for Russian applicants. In Norway, the increased border traffic at 
Storskog/Boris Gleb has made a positive impact on the local economy in Sør Varanger 
municipality, largely due to the large number of Russian shopping tourists who visit this 
area.137 Since Sør Varanger appears to be the only Norwegian region where there is a direct 
economic utility caused by border-crossings, it becomes reasonable that Norway only has a 
VFA agreement limited to this particular area. Nevertheless, if the economic utility of tourism 
is the explanation behind the Local Border Traffic Agreement, it would be reasonable that the 
agreement covered a larger territory, including, for instance, Murmansk city, which stands 
behind the main group of Russian tourists who visit Sør Varanger. This is, however, not the 
case. As expressed by foreign ministers Jonas Gahr Støre and Sergey Lavrov, a central 
objective in the Norwegian-Russian relations is visa freedom, although this will not be 
achieved overnight but through small steps such as the Local Border Traffic Agreement.138 
This suggestively implies that the economy factor alone is not strong enough to fully explain 
how Norway shapes its visa regime with Russia. 
 
In terms of explaining the differences in national visa practices, the economy factor has some 
other significant weaknesses as well. Firstly, the overall economic utility of cross-border 
movement does not correlate with the extent of visa issuance. For instance, in all Finnish 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135 Official Statistics of Finland (OSF): Accommodation statistics [e-publication]. ISSN=1799-6325. February 
2013. Helsinki: Statistics Finland [referred: 10.5.2013]. 
136 Statistics Norway (2013a). ”Accommodation, March 2013. Hotels and similar establishments. Guest nights, 
by nationality of the guests.” URL: https://www.ssb.no/en/transport-og-
reiseliv/statistikker/overnatting/maaned/2013-05-06?fane=tabell&sort=nummer&tabell=110818 (Retrieved on 
May 10, 2013). 
137 Aftenposten (2012). ”Til Russland med sko.” December 2012. URL: 
http://www.aftenposten.no/nyheter/uriks/Til-Russland-med-sko-7004747.html. Retrieved on February 2, 2013.   
138 Arbeidsmanden (2013). ”Norsk-Russisk visjon om visumfrihet.” Published on October 2, 2010. URL: 
http://www.arbeidsmanden.no/anb-nyheter/article5369090.ece (Retrieved on May 8, 2013). 
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regions bordering to Russia, the gross domestic product per capita appears to be significantly 
lower than the national average, while the unemployment rate is higher.139 Compared to the 
Finnish border regions, the average unemployment rate in Sør Varanger is among the lowest 
in Norway (about two percent).140 Moreover, the share of tourism in the Finnish GDP is only 
three percent, meaning that while economic utility is partly important for visa issuance it is 
not the main reason why Finland’s practices the CVP the way it does.141 
 
Secondly, the economy factor cannot explain the differences between Finland and Norway at 
the negotiation level. The differences in their economic conditions does not have a direct 
impact on negotiation practices: despite having a higher GDP than Finland,142 which arguably 
strengthens its international position, Norway still comes second in terms of negotiation 
efficiency, largely because of Finland’s head start participation in the early development 
stages of the Schengen framework. Thus, an overall remark would be that the economy factor 
only partly explains the CVP differences between Finland and Norway, and that other factors 
are necessary to get a better understanding of these differences. The following section 
examines security as the explanatory factor. 
 
4.3 Security as the explanatory factor 
 
How can security explain the differences in negotiation practices? As demonstrated in the 
previous chapter, the EU reviews Finland and Norway’s competences in external border 
security somewhat differently. While the Finnish external border control is seen as more solid 
and competent, the Norwegian is regarded as non-professional because its guards are less 
experienced and mainly serve the border guard as part of their military service rather than as a 
profession.143 Arguably, this may have an impact on the differences in visa practices. If the 
EU views Finland’s external borders security as exemplary, Finland has a better chance in 
influencing the EU by promoting its national interests regarding visa policy because the EU 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139 Golunov, Serghei (2013). EU-Russian Border Security: Challenges, (Mis)Perceptions and Responses. 
Routledge, 2013: New York, USA. 
140 Statistics Norway (2013b). ”Registrerte arbeidsledige i kmmuner, 2013”. URL: www.ssb.no (Retrieved on 
May 11, 2013).  
141 Ministry of the Employment and the Economy of Finland (2013). ”Tourism’s significance to Finland’s 
national economy.” Last updated on May 8, 2013. URL: http://www.tem.fi/?l=en&s=2839 (Retrieved on May 
11, 2013). 
142 CIA: The World Factbook (2013). ”GDP Country Comparison, 2012”. URL: 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook//rankorder/2001rank.html (Retrieved on May 10, 
2013).	  
143 Barents Observer (2013c). 
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has a greater confidence in Finland’s practices. This would suggestively explain why 
Finland’s visa regime with Russia has been through relatively few technical changes (as 
opposed to other Schengen members including Norway), and why it has managed to influence 
such a big part of the Schengen acquis. 
 
The example above has illustrated that there is a connection between security and negotiation 
practices on visa policy. However, this statement is not flawless. For instance, there is very 
little or no clear evidence showing exactly how the different security competences are 
emphasized during negotiations on Schengen developments, which makes it difficult to 
determine the extent of their practical importance in this respect. Arguably, it is more 
important to note that both countries’ security authorities are, in fact, successful in preventing 
cross-border crime and illegal immigration, despite having different security approaches and 
different reviews by the EU. Both of them have also undergone relatively few changes to their 
visa regimes with Russia, compared to other peripheral Schengen states such as, for instance, 
Poland.144 This implies that Finland and Norway show generally good results in border 
security management and that this, most likely, should have a similar positive affect on their 
respective negotiation opportunities at the intergovernmental level. In other words, the 
security factor fails to explain the full scope of national differences at the negotiation level.     
 
At the executive level of practice, however, border security appears to have a larger impact on 
Finland and Norway’s visa practices, and thus on the underlying differences between them. 
For example, in March 2013 the Finnish and Russian border security authorities signed an 
agreement on enhanced cooperation to ensure a more efficient border management 
(particularly with regard to the growing cross-border traffic) and also “to expedite 
development of infrastructure”, as the Finnish Minister for European Affairs and Foreign 
Trade, Alexander Stubb, explicitly expressed.145 This example suggests that while Finland 
arguably has the most developed border guard, and geographically the longest stretching 
border with Russia, it is also more concerned with the efficiency of handling cross-border 
traffic and, subsequently, visa issuance. As for the Norwegian case, border security is still 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Migration Information Source (2010). ”EU Membership Highlights Poland’s Migration Challenges.” 
Published on September 2010. URL: http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=800 
(Retrieved on May 11, 2013).	  
145 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Finland (2013b). ”Finland and Russia agreed upon closer border cooperation in 
Turku.” Press release 72/2013.  Published on March 27, 2013. URL: 
http://formin.finland.fi/public/default.aspx?contentid=273363&contentlan=2&culture=en-US (Retrieved on May 
10, 2013). 
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very important, but the concerns about enhancing its security standards – such as replacing 
military conscripts with a more experienced staff – are not among its top priorities. 
Consequently, and in contrast to Finland, Norway is also less likely to engage in a similar 
Norwegian-Russian border cooperation in the nearest future or to make its border 
management and visa issuance more like Finland’s.  
 
Nevertheless, one central aspect is worth drawing attention to in this context. An explanation 
of national differences based on the security factor is almost never entirely based on security. 
As the example above has demonstrated, factors like geography, history and tradition become 
almost equally important for the different ways in which Finland and Norway shape and 
practice their visa policies. Therefore, neither the culture-, economy- or security factor alone 
can fully explain why Finland and Norway’s visa practices diverge the way they do. Having 
said this, it becomes clear that in order for the analysis to be more valid, one would have to 
include a factor that explains the differences in national visa practices more widely and, at the 
same time, account for aspects like history, tradition and geography. Thus, the following 
explanatory factor is the quasi-constructivist factor of historical bordering traditions. 
 
4.4 Historical bordering traditions as the explanatory factor 
 
Finland and Norway’s divergent experiences in visa politics demonstrate an interesting point: 
despite the changes that came with globalization, European integration, the freedom of 
movement and the Schengen Agreement, member states still tend to be tied by old habits in 
their national visa policies. Understanding this tendency is part of the key to understanding 
future developments of the Schengen cooperation and the signatories’ participation in it. A 
well-known quote by the Chinese philosopher Confucius says: “study the past if you would 
define the future”.146 This adds an importance to the final explanatory factor of my analysis, 
which emphasizes that the current visa policies have been shaped by a history of bordering 
traditions. Accordingly, the divergent visa practices of Finland and Norway can best be 
explained by the differences in their historical bordering traditions. 
 
It is reasonable to argue that the main explanation to why Finland’s negotiation practices and, 
subsequently, its executive visa practices are more efficient than Norway’s is its historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146 Confucius (ca. 479 BCE - 221 BCE). In James Legge (2010): The Analects of Confucius. Mobile Reference 
Publishing, 2010: Boston, USA. 
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bordering relationship with Russia. Throughout the Finnish bordering history, Finland has 
undergone many changes and at least three major stages of border evolution. Firstly, there 
was a stage in when Finland was under Russian rule – a period considered to be very dark and 
chaotic.147 Secondly, there was a stage where Finland got its independence and started to form 
a nation state. Finally, there was a third stage, which can be considered as the “mature stage” 
of the Finnish bordering history. These historical changes brought not only geographical 
changes to the Finnish-Russian border, which was redrawn several times during these 
stages.148 They also made Finland more experienced in border management because of its 
good knowledge of the Russian society, having been part of it at an earlier stage.  
 
It is, perhaps, the close historical ties that has made Russia more understandable to Finland 
and enabled it to form a visa regime that does not require invitations. Given that the Finnish 
and the Russian societies have developed a relatively good understanding of each other over 
the years, one may find a possible explanation to why Russian tourism is such a success in 
Finland, and hence why Finland choses to make visas more accessible to Russian visitors. 
Because of a shared bordering history, Russians have been traveling to Finland for centuries – 
from the first migratory wave in the 18th century to the present immigration and reuniting of 
old family ties.149 In 2011 over 16% of Finland’s population were ethnic Russians, being the 
second largest group of foreign immigrants after Estonia.150 Moreover, Finland currently has a 
Russian radio channel and an independent Russian-language monthly magazine.151 The 
overall assessment is that history has facilitated visa accessibility the same way it has 
facilitated tourism.   
 
Consequently, this has created an important basis for the recent Finnish-Russian relations and 
thus the Finnish role at the European level. Finland was important for the EU in the 1990s, as 
it was the first country entering Schengen that had a border to Russia and had the best 
competence in order to manage Schengen’s external borders. This illustrates that the historical 
bordering traditions provide a good explanation for the way Finland practices the Schengen 
CVP. Moreover, considering the fact that Finland’s bordering to Russia is still considered 	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more efficient than Norway’s, it is more likely that its competences will remain important to 
the EU in the years to come, especially with regard to the current talks on visa freedom at the 
supranational relationship between Russia and the EU.  
 
In similar fashion, Norway’s historical bordering traditions can explain the Norwegian way of 
practicing the Schengen CVP. Norway has had a slightly different bordering history with 
Russia and has therefore shaped a different kind of regime. Firstly, the Norwegian-Russian 
bordering history is more commonly traced back to World War II, when Norway and Russia 
cooperated on the fight against German invaders in Sør Varanger. During that time, many 
central developments in border management were made cooperatively by Norway and Russia 
– for instance, border checkpoints were established at Storskog / Boris Gleb and a mutual 
agreement was made on the principal to reduce unintended border traffic.152 In the following 
stage, the Cold War period made a significant impact on the Norwegian border management, 
as it became responsible for guarding the borderline between NATO and the Soviet Union. 
The affiliation with NATO put pressure on Norway’s position as Soviet’s geographical 
neighbor, but also ensured that this cross-border relationship became important to the West 
and the later EU countries.153 As expressed by Sverre Lodgaard, the Norwegian-Russian 
border has always been peaceful, even during Soviet times. 154  However, both of the 
mentioned historical examples have an apparent effect on the way Norway manages its visa 
policies today. Firstly, the Norwegian tendency towards “reservedness” (explained in chapter 
4.1) can be explained by the fact that an significant part of Norway’s bordering traditions was 
based on restriction of cross-border movement – first of the German invaders during World 
War II, and later of the Soviet troops during the Cold War. This further explains why 
Norway’s visa issuance procedures are more complex and time-consuming, and why Norway 
is more concerned with formalism than Finland. Moreover, Norway’s bordering traditions 
have ensured an international relevance of the border area between Norway and Russia, which 
would ultimately explain why the Local Border Traffic agreement was only limited to this 
particular area, as opposed to a larger area or generally increased visa accessibility. 	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Summing up, historical bordering traditions have proven to be successful in explaining the 
differences in national CVP practices between Finland and Norway. The factor has managed 
to explain why Finland issues more visas than Norway, and why its practices are considered 
to be more efficient and why it has managed to influence a greater part of the Schengen 
framework. Historical bordering traditions have also explained why Norway’s practices are 
more restrictive than Finland’s in terms of visa accessibility, and why Norway has conducted 
the “locally limited” VFA agreement with Russia while Finland has not.  
 
However, this factor is facing a few challenges. It is difficult to determine the degree to which 
history permeates the national interests of states in intergovernmental negotiations. How deep 
are the traces set by the historical events of the past, and to what extent are they emphasized 
when national governments meet to bargain on the Schengen developments? Due to the fact 
that the “historical bordering traditions” factor sometimes appears rather vague, it fails to 
explain the extent to which history is practically relevant in negotiations. It may be true that 
history matters, but it is also true that certain historical events matter less with time and that 
the differences between states reflect current issues rather than old, historical ones. Moreover, 
because there is a considerable amount of time between the older historical events and the 
current negotiations that the national differences are arguably better explained with more 
intermediate, and less vague, factors such as culture, economy, and security.  
 
Still, it is important to note that culture, economy and security are all part of history, and that 
using the “historical bordering traditions” means using all those factors combined in addition 
to a historical perspective. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that “historical bordering 
traditions” is the best factor to explain the logic of divergent visa practices.  
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
A few decades ago, it would have been very unlikely to imagine a borderless Europe. Yet the 
Schengen cooperation has made it possible for 26 signatories to cross its internal borders 
without requiring a passport. Consequently, this cooperation has become important for many 
reasons, such as the fact that freedom of movement enables people-to-people contact, which 
further enhances international trade and cooperation. The Schengen cooperation is gradually 
in development towards more efficient visa relations with third countries, and one of the 
current objectives for Schengen is the “common steps towards visa freedom” with Russia. 
The Finnish and Norwegian cases have shown that national experiences in visa politics can be 
just as important in making these “common steps” as the supranational ones.  
 
This thesis has examined and compared national visa practices between Finland and Norway. 
It has focused on several goals and primarily the goal to establish how Finland negotiates with 
Schengen on legislation to shape its visa regime with Russia, compared to how Norway does 
it. The three-level analysis has provided a detailed overview of the main differences between 
the Finnish and Norwegian visa politics at the executive level, the implementation level and 
the negotiation level. Another important goal was to explain why the national experiences 
differ, by using four hypothetical factors. This chapter will provide a summery and a brief 
discussion of the main findings, as well as some thoughts regarding the future research on the 
Schengen visa politics. 
 
5.1 Main findings 
 
The main results of the three-level analysis have demonstrated that Finland and Norway, in 
fact, have rather different visa experiences in their respective visa regimes with Russia. 
Formally, both countries have the same negotiation opportunities at the intergovernmental 
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level, although historical events have suggestively made Finland’s bargaining position 
stronger than Norway’s. Because of its historical relations with Russia, Finland was able to 
play a central role in the early developments of the Schengen acquis. This means that the 
current legal framework coincides more with the old Finnish visa practices, arguably 
representing many of the Finnish national interests, as opposed to the Norwegian ones.  
 
Nevertheless, Norway has taken the utilization of the Schengen acquis a step further towards 
visa freedom by concluding the Local Border Traffic VFA with Russia. This means that 
Norway’s interpretation of the Schengen legislation is more liberal than Finland’s. It also 
means that the Schengen framework is flexible and that it allows for certain exceptions in 
national practices. However, Finland annually issues the highest number of visas making 
them more accessible to Russians due to the invitation-free requirements, shorter issuance 
procedures and better services.  
 
Essentially, Finland’s visa practices are to be considered the most efficient, and the best 
explanation for this is its historical bordering traditions. Finland’s history of border relations 
with Russia has made it better acquainted with the Russian society and thus has a better 
competence in border management, cooperation and visa practices.  
 
In conclusion, it can be stated that all countries are alike in the sense that they all have their 
individual patterns regarding visa practices. Yet at the same time, countries are different in the 
sense that each pattern is different from one another. The characteristic of each pattern is 
multidimensional and can therefore have various explanations. However, at the end of the 
day, history appears to be the strongest explanatory factor because it accounts for several 
social dimensions as well as specific historical events. As for the future of the Schengen 
cooperation, history will probably be a good way to predict the upcoming developments. This 
would be beyond the scope of this study, although it poses an interesting challenge to future 
research on the Schengen visa politics. 
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